

Zersetzung

Decomposition and Disruption



David Childers

Foreword

Greetings,

Our quest begins as many often do, with a question ...

Is there a scientifically documented inconspicuous method for the manipulation of people?

In this publication I will document and provided information regarding Zersetzung.

The German Democratic Republic (East German) Ministry For State Security STASI (East German Intelligence Agency) did develop such an operational technique using subtle processes to manipulate and control the population of East Germany. This technique was known as Zersetzung ("decomposition" and "disruption") and was a psychological warfare method used to repress political opponents. This capability was developed to combat alleged and actual dissidents through covert means. These methods of repression and control were accomplished using secret programs of abusive power and psychological manipulation. Targets were commonly chosen on a pre-emptive or preventative basis to limit or stop improper political activities. Zersetzung's methods were designed to break down, undermine, and paralyze people behind "a facade of social normality" in the form of "silent repression."

David Childers

December 26 2022

Musical Inspiration

Adele - Skyfall

Cover Image

https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:MFS_Wappen_1.svg

Translation of Richtlinie Nr. 1-76 provided by

https://www.reddit.com/r/history/comments/lan3gq/east_german_stasi_field_manual_n76_zersetzung/

PDF Richtlinie Nr. 1-76 manual provided by

Stasi Media Library - German Federal Archives

<https://www.stasi-mediathek.de/medien/richtlinie-176-zur-bearbeitung-operativer-vorgaenge/blatt/307/>

Index

License	Page 4
Introduction	Page 5
English Translation	Page 9
Original German Text	Page 65

Creative Common License

This body of work is released under the Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0), Creative Common License.

You are free to:

Share - copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format

Adapt - remix, transform, and build upon the material for any purpose, even commercially.

The licensor cannot revoke these freedoms as long as you follow the license terms.

Under the following terms:

Attribution - You must give appropriate credit, provide a link to the license, and indicate if changes were made. You may do so in any reasonable manner, but not in any way that suggests the licensor endorses you or your use.

For the complete legal code, please refer here:

<https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/>

Introduction

The Ministry for State Security defined Zersetzung in its 1985 dictionary of political operatives as

... a method of operation by the Ministry for State Security for an efficacious struggle against subversive activities, particularly in the treatment of operations. With Zersetzung, one can influence hostile and negative individuals across different operational, political activities, especially the hostile and negative aspects of their dispositions and beliefs, so these are abandoned and changed little by little, and, if applicable, the contradictions and differences between the hostile and negative forces would be laid open, exploited, and reinforced.

The goal of Zersetzung is to fragment, paralyze, disorganize, and isolate specific hostile or antagonistic forces. These actions will result in preventatively impeding malicious and harmful activities. To broadly restrict or altogether avert them, and if applicable, to prepare the ground for a political and ideological reestablishment.

Zersetzung is equally an immediate constitutive element of "operational procedures" and other preventive activities to impede hostile gatherings. The principal force employed to implement Zersetzung is the unofficial collaborators. Zersetzung presupposes information and significant proof of malicious activities planned, prepared, and accomplished as well as anchor points corresponding to measures of Zersetzung.

Zersetzung must be produced based on a root cause analysis of the facts and the exact definition of a concrete goal. Zersetzung must be executed uniformly and supervised; its results must be documented.

The explosive political force of Zersetzung heightens demands regarding the maintenance of secrecy.

The term Zersetzung is generally translated into English as "decomposition," although it can be variously translated as "decay," "corrosion," "undermining," "biodegradation," or "dissolution." The term was first used in a prosecutorial context in Nazi Germany as part of the term Wehrkraftzersetzung (or Zersetzung der Wehrkraft). In Western terminology, Zersetzung can be described as the active application of psychological destabilization procedures by the State apparatus.

In Practice

The Stasi used Zersetzung essentially as a means of psychological oppression and persecution. Findings of operational psychology were formulated into the method at the Stasi's College of Law (Juristische Hochschule der Staatssicherheit, or JHS) and applied to political opponents in an effort to undermine their self-confidence and self-esteem. Operations were designed to intimidate and destabilize them by subjecting them to repeated disappointment and to socially alienate them by interfering with and disrupting their relationships with others, as in social undermining. The aim was to induce personal crises in victims, leaving them too unnerved and psychologically distressed to have the time and energy for anti-government activism. The Stasi intentionally concealed their role as masterminds of the operations. Author Jürgen Fuchs was a victim of Zersetzung and wrote about his experience, describing the Stasi's actions as "psychosocial crime" and "an assault on the human soul."

Zersetzung was not rigorously defined until the mid-1970s and only then began to be carried out systematically in the 1970s and 1980s. These techniques, however, had been established by the late 1950s. It is difficult to determine how many people were targeted since the sources have been deliberately and considerably redacted; it is known, however, that tactics varied in scope and that several different departments implemented them. Overall there was a ratio of four or five authorized Zersetzung operators for each targeted group and three for each individual. Some sources indicate that around 5,000 people were "persistently victimized" by Zersetzung. At the College of Legal Studies, the number of dissertations submitted on the subject of Zersetzung was in double figures. It also had a comprehensive 50-page Zersetzung teaching manual, which included numerous examples of its practice.

Use Against Individuals

The Stasi applied Zersetzung before, during, after, or instead of incarcerating the targeted individual. The implementation of Zersetzung—euphemistically called Operativer Vorgang ("operational procedure") generally did not aim to gather evidence against the target in order to initiate criminal proceedings. Instead, the Stasi considered Zersetzung as a separate measure to be used when official judiciary procedures were undesirable for political reasons, such as the international image of the GDR. However, in some instances, the Stasi attempted to entrap individuals; for example, in Wolf Biermann's case, the Stasi set him up with minors, hoping they could pursue criminal charges. The crimes targeted for such entrapment were non-political, such as drug possession, trafficking, theft, financial fraud, and rape.

...the Stasi often used a method which was really diabolic. It was called Zersetzung, and it's described in another guideline. The word is difficult to translate because it means originally "biodegradation." But actually, it's a quite accurate description. The goal was to destroy secretly the self-confidence of people, for example by damaging their reputation, by organizing failures in their work, and by destroying their personal relationships. Considering this, East Germany was a very modern dictatorship. The Stasi didn't try to arrest every dissident. It preferred to paralyze them, and it could do so because it had access to so much personal information and to so many institutions.

—Hubertus Knabe, German historian

Directive 1/76 lists the following as tried and tested forms of Zersetzung, among others:

...a systematic degradation of reputation, image, and prestige on the basis of true, verifiable and discrediting information together with untrue, credible, irrefutable, and thus also discrediting information; a systematic engineering of social and professional failures to undermine the self-confidence of individuals; ... engendering of doubts regarding future prospects; engendering of mistrust and mutual suspicion within groups ...; interrupting respectively impeding the mutual relations within a group in space or time ..., for example by ... assigning geographically distant workplaces.

— Directive No. 1/76 of January 1976 for the development of "operational procedures."

Beginning with intelligence obtained by espionage, the Stasi established "sociograms" and "psychograms," which it applied for the psychological forms of Zersetzung. They exploited various personal traits, which included: homosexuality, as well as supposed character weaknesses of the targeted individual—for example, a professional failure, negligence of parental duties, pornographic interests, divorce, alcoholism, dependence on medications, criminal tendencies, passion for a collection or a game, or contacts with circles of the extreme

right—or even the veil of shame from the rumors poured out upon one's circle of acquaintances. The measures were the most fruitful when they were applied in connection with a personality; all "schematism" had to be avoided from the point of view of the Stasi.

Tactics and methods employed under Zersetzung generally involved disrupting the victim's private or family life. This often included psychological attacks in the form of gaslighting. Other practices included property damage, sabotage of cars, purposely incorrect medical treatment, smear campaigns including sending falsified compromising photos or documents to the victim's family, denunciation, provocation, psychological warfare, psychological subversion, wiretapping, and bugging.

It has been investigated, but not established, that the Stasi used X-ray devices in a directed and weaponized manner to cause long-term health problems in its opponents. That said, Rudolf Bahro, Gerulf Pannach, and Jürgen Fuchs, three influential dissidents who had been imprisoned at the same time, died of cancer within two years. A study by the Federal Commissioner for the Records of the State Security Service of the former GDR (Bundesbeauftragte für die Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen Deutschen Demokratischen Republik or BStU) has meanwhile rejected based on extant documents such as fraudulent use of X-rays, and only mentions isolated and unintentional cases of the harmful use of sources of radiation, for example, to mark documents.

In the target's name, the Stasi made little announcements, ordered products, and made emergency calls to terrorize them. To threaten or intimidate or cause psychoses, the Stasi gained access to the target's living quarters and left visible traces of its presence by adding, removing, and modifying objects such as the socks in one's drawer, or by altering the time that an alarm clock was set to go off.

Use Against Groups And Social Relations

The Stasi manipulated friendship, love, marriage, and family relationships through anonymous letters, telegrams, telephone calls, and compromising photos, often altered. In this manner, parents and children were supposed to systematically become strangers to one another. To provoke conflicts and extramarital relations, the Stasi put in place targeted seductions by Romeo agents.

For the Zersetzung of groups, it infiltrated them with unofficial collaborators, sometimes minors. The work of opposition groups was hindered by permanent counter-propositions and discord on the part of unofficial collaborators when making decisions. To sow mistrust within the group, the Stasi made implanted members that were unofficial collaborators. They also acted by spreading rumors and manipulating photos. The Stasi feigned indiscretions with unofficial collaborators or placed members of targeted groups in administrative posts to make others believe that this was a reward for the activity of an unofficial collaborator. They even aroused suspicions regarding certain group members by assigning privileges like housing or a personal car. Moreover, the imprisonment of only certain group members gave birth to suspicions.

Targeted Groups

Punks were one such group considered culturally and politically incorrect and thereby deemed 'hostile negative.' This led to them being persecuted with 'the usual battery of 'decomposition' methods,' which were used to 'discredit individuals and splinter, disorientate and [...] dissolve' the various groupings.

The Stasi used Zersetzung tactics both on individuals and groups. There was no particular homogeneous target group, as opposition in the GDR came from several different sources. Tactical plans were thus separately adapted to each perceived threat. The Stasi nevertheless defined several main target groups:

- Associations of people making collective visa applications for travel abroad.
- Artists' groups critical of the government.
- Religious opposition groups.
- Youth subculture groups.
- Groups supporting the above.
(human rights and peace organizations, those assisting illegal departure from the GDR, and expatriate and defector movements).

The Stasi also occasionally used Zersetzung on non-political organizations regarded as undesirable, such as the Watchtower Society.

Prominent individuals targeted by Zersetzung operations included Jürgen Fuchs, Gerulf Pannach, Rudolf Bahro, Robert Havemann, Rainer Eppelmann, Reiner Kunze, husband, and wife Gerd and Ulrike Poppe, and Wolfgang Templin.

<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zersetzung>

Translation

January 1976

Guideline No. 1/76 for the development and processing of operational processes (OV)

This ENGLISH translation begins with page 11 of the Richtlinie Nr. 1-76 manual provided by Stasi Media Library - German Federal Archives.

BSIV
000307

MINISTERRAT
DER DEUTSCHEN DEMOKRATISCHEN REPUBLIK
Ministerium für Staatssicherheit
Der Minister

GVSI E 273176 Be.

GVS MfS 008 - 100/76

Ex.-Nr. 0011 *

Richtlinie Nr. 1/76

January 1976

Guideline No. 1/76 for the development and processing of operational processes (OV)

Proof / source: BStU, MfS, BdL-Dok. 3234 - print, 59 pages - no MfS-DSt-Nr.

Head of the document / notes: [On the cover page, p. 1:] Council of Ministers of the German Democratic Republic, Ministry for State Security, The Minister - Secret classified information GVS MfS 008-100 / 76 -

1161. edition, 30 sheets - [on p. 59, according to text:] Mielke, Colonel General.

Additional information: Ges. 1501 Ex. - Standard distributor - RL 1/76 continues various provisions on operational processes, especially in instructions on types of operations - Inoperative due to the dissolution of MfS / AfNS (according to the letter of 29.11.1989 on the reduction of official regulations - Annex 2 - this document is one of the provisions that should continue to apply as a transitional arrangement). Annexes / subordinate provisions: 1. DfB v. January 1976 (VVS 113/76): Registration and recording of OV as well as management of the case files (BStU, MfS, BdL-Dok. 3235) - letter for the enforcement of guidelines and 1. DfB v. 1.3.1976 (BStU, MfS, BdL-Dok. 3238) - 2nd DfB v. February 15, 1985 (GVS 6/85): Processing of central operational processes (BStU, MfS, BdL-Dok. 3237).

structure

[...]

The further shaping of the developed socialist society in the GDR, the all-round strengthening of the socialist community of states, the further enforcement of the principles of peaceful coexistence and the struggle to maintain and secure peace take place in hard class struggle with imperialism.

Reliable protection of social development and the all-round guarantee of internal security in the GDR require the Ministry for State Security to purposefully, concentrate and focus on preventive prevention, detection and combating of all subversive attacks by the enemy.

An important prerequisite for the successful solution of this main task is the constant qualification of the development and processing of operational processes on the basis of a focus-related political-operational basic work to guarantee the security and order in the respective area of responsibility.

The goal-oriented development and processing of operational processes is primarily a preventive measure to prevent hostile-negative forces from becoming effective, to prevent the occurrence of possible damage, dangers or other serious consequences of hostile negative actions and thus to make a significant contribution to the continuous implementation of the party's policy - and to provide governance.

The heads of the operational service units have to concentrate their management and management activities on the development and processing of operational processes

ensure that the operational forces and resources, especially the IM and GMS, are used and developed in a concentrated manner to solve these tasks. The heads of all management levels must use all opportunities for a targeted, political ideological education of operational employees and for their Chekist qualification for a qualified development and processing of operational processes.

The solution of the tasks set out in this guideline has to be closely related to the enforcement of the other basic documents such as guideline no. 1/68¹, 2/68,² 1/70³ and 1/71⁴, as well as the political-operational tasks specified in the other official regulations.

The stipulations on the guarantee of conspiracy and secrecy must be consistently enforced in the management and management activities to qualify the development and processing of operational processes, in the preparation and implementation of all political-operational measures aimed at this, as well as in the management of the process files.

1. The single-minded development of operational processes

1.1 The systematic, focus-based development of basic materials for operational processes with high security policy importance

In order to carry out the tasks assigned to the MfS by the party and state leadership, the development of starting materials for operational processes has to be carried out, above all to secure political-operational priority areas and to deal with political-operational priorities. This includes, if indications of hostile-negative actions outside of previously recognized political-operational focus areas become known, to develop these likewise purposefully into starting materials for operational processes or to clarify them in some other way. It must be ensured that all indications of hostile-negative actions are recognized in good time and dealt with in a concentrated manner.

The managers have to ensure that starting materials for operational processes are developed primarily where

- hostile attacks can cause the greatest threats to the internal security of the GDR;

¹ Guideline 1/68 for cooperation with GMS and IM. In: Müller-Enbergs, Helmut (ed.): Inofficial employees of the Ministry for State Security, guidelines and implementation regulations. 1st and 2nd ed., Berlin 1996, 3rd, through. 2001, 544 pp.

² Guideline 2/68 for working with IM in the operating area. In: Müller-Enbergs, Helmut (ed.): Inofficial employees of the Ministry for State Security. Part 2: Instructions for working with agents, scouts and spies in the Federal Republic of Germany. 1st and 2nd ed., Berlin 1998, 1118 pp.

³ Guideline 1/70: Planning guideline (BStU, MfS, BdL-Dok. 2550). Directive 1/71

^{4th} on operational checks on persons.

- According to our knowledge, the enemy is likely to attack and cause significant damage;
- hostile-negative actions, influences and dangers as well as other phenomena that disrupt and inhibit social development must be combated aggressively;
- favorable conditions and circumstances for the damage to the GDR or the abuse, exploitation and inclusion of citizens of the GDR in hostile activity are to be eliminated as a preventive measure.

The systematic development of starting materials for operational processes requires the thorough and all-round political-operational penetration of the politically operational priority areas. It has to meet the following requirements:

1. Comprehensive deepening of knowledge of the security-political significance of the political-operational priority areas, in particular with regard to their significance for the fulfillment of the tasks set by the party and state leadership and the hostile attacks directed against the political-operational priority areas in the past or hostile negative actions occurred.
2. The elaboration of the areas, processes, groups of people and persons who, within the political-operational priority area, have a significant influence on the planned implementation of the social priority tasks, for which operationally significant information is available and which for other reasons are at the center of anticipated hostile attacks.
3. Ensuring a constant overview of all operational materials, personal control files, operational processes and other political-operational work results related to the political-operational focus area, in particular the results of the clarification of the question »Who is who? «In the politically operational focus area, and their exact analysis.

The use of the IM and GMS in the political-operational penetration of the political-operational focus areas is to be concentrated on recognizing and working out

- References to hostile-negative actions;
- People or groups of people in the political-operational priority areas on which the enemy is concentrating and through whom he is trying to implement his plans, intentions and measures, and the enemy's possibilities (paths, connections, contacts) to influence and influence these groups of people to become effective;
- favorable conditions and circumstances for the conduct and disguise of hostile-negative actions;

- imperialist secret services and other hostile centers, organizations and forces that act against the political-operational focus area;
- Areas, processes, groups of people and persons in the political-operational priority area, which are of particular importance for ensuring security and order as well as the fulfillment of social priority tasks;
- References to operationally significant incidents, dangers and circumstances and related persons.

On the basis of the information compiled in the process, the heads of the operational service units must specifically specify to the subordinate heads and operational employees:

- which areas, processes, groups of people and persons who have a significant influence on the fulfillment of the main social tasks within the political-operational focus area, are to be secured in the long term and continuously through the concentrated use of operational staff and resources;
- where and when primarily starting materials about which people or facts are to be developed in order to ward off hostile-negative actions;
- where and when, if there are indications of the planning, preparation and implementation of terrorist or diversion crimes, anti-subversive human trafficking, unlawful leaving the GDR, violent crimes and serious military crimes, it is necessary to initiate immediate measures to prevent them in good time;
- on the basis of which already compacted and checked source materials an operational process is to be created;
- where, when and how information is to be passed on to other governing bodies, companies, combines and institutions as well as social organizations and forces to initiate effective preventive measures.

The necessary political-operational tasks and measures for the development of operational processes are to be included in the work plans of the service units in accordance with Directive No. 1/70.

In order to create the prerequisites for the development of starting materials for operational processes, a constant analytical assessment (inventory) of the effectiveness of the operational forces and resources, in particular the IM and GMS, must be carried out in relation to the political-operational priority areas. The priority is to develop:

- which IM and GMS are available for the single-minded development of raw materials for operational processes;

- With which orders the IM and GMS have been used so far, which options are available and which political-operational results have been achieved so far by the IM and GMS;
- which concrete status has been reached in the planned qualification of the IM and GMS for the development of raw materials for operational processes.

The heads of the operational service units must determine on the basis of these assessments:

- how the operational forces and resources, in particular the IM and GMS, are to be used for the preventive prevention and detection of hostile-negative actions;
- which measures must be initiated for further qualification and profiling of the IM and GMS;
- how existing gaps in securing the political-operational priority areas are to be closed, in particular through the targeted acquisition of suitable IM and GMS;
- how existing possibilities for the development of operational processes are to be closed.

These specifications are to be included in the work plans and the processing concepts for the political-operational priority areas and must contain the necessary responsibilities and deadlines.

1.2 The qualified use of IM and GMS to develop basic materials for operational processes

1.2.1 The directions of use of the IM and GMS for the development of raw materials for operational processes

The heads of the operational service units and the operational employees have to determine, organize and control the further personal and factual deployment of the IM and GMS on the basis of the results of the political and operational penetration of the political and operational priority areas, in accordance with their responsibility.

The use of the IM and GMS should be geared towards the development and documentation of such information and evidence that contain indications of hostile-negative actions. At the same time, preventive and damage-preventing measures must be implemented.

General directions of use of the IM and GMS are:

1. Determination and clarification of references to manifestations and effects of political-ideological diversion, hostile contact policy / contact activity and hostile base activities

In order to determine and clarify the political-ideological diversion, the IM and GMS must above all work out

- what means and methods are used; through which
- channels it takes effect;
- who belongs to the carriers and disseminators;
- what verifiable effects there are, especially among the target groups;
- what favorable conditions and circumstances exist and how they can be overcome.

In order to establish and clarify the hostile contact policy / contact activity, the IM and GMS must above all work out

- how operationally important contacts are established, maintained and expanded and which people are used for this purpose;
- which people already have operationally important contacts or what information is available;
- in which areas operationally important contacts are concentrated; what effects
- have occurred;
- which imperialist secret services, other hostile centers, organizations and forces develop special activities and which methods they use;
- which connections are used for hostile contact activity; which contact activities
- emanate from the privileged persons.

In order to determine and investigate enemy base activities, the IM and GMS must above all work out

- what imperialist secret services, other enemy centers, organizations and forces are striving to create enemy bases (individuals or groups);
- which means and methods they use and how the step-by-step procedure is carried out;
- which people are of particular interest and where there are indications of the effectiveness of hostile action;
- what characteristics these people have, such as B. a hostile-negative attitude to the GDR; certain personality traits such as careerism, selfishness, corruptibility; a professional position and qualification that includes opportunities to bring about decisions that harm the GDR; official or private connections to persons in corporations and other institutions of the various social areas of the FRG, others

Non-socialist countries and West Berlin as well as persons in state institutions of these countries or in the Senate of West Berlin who act as organizers of hostile base activities in the GDR.

In order to uncover the criminal activity of the imperialist secret services in their entire breadth, the IM and GMS are to be instructed and instructed in a targeted manner within the framework of this operational direction. The possibilities of the IM and GMS are also to be used purposefully to develop assessments of changes in the enemy's approach, his goals and interests and thus to complete the image of the enemy.

2. Detection and clarification of indications of intended, prepared, attempted or already carried out acts of state hostility and adjoining serious crimes of general crime as well as other hostile-negative acts

Attention should be paid to hostile-negative acts that are deliberately kept below the limit of criminal relevance by the enemy.

Information and evidence are to be developed with the IM and GMS, from which indications of the violation of specific criminal offenses emerge, such as

- Treason crimes and offenses against secrecy;
- anti-state trafficking in human beings, illegal leaving the GDR;
- Sabotage or crimes against diversion, abuse of trust, infidelity to the detriment of socialist property, bribery, crimes against general security;
- Terrorist crimes, gun crimes, crimes against life or health; subversive agitation, subversive group formation and other criminal associations, serious crimes against the state and public order, such as in particular hooliganism, rioting.

3. Detection and clarification of operationally significant incidents

The IM and GMS are to be used primarily in connection with forensic and operational-technical and other means and methods for

- Determining the causes;
- Identification of indications of hostile-negative actions;
- Determination of damage and effects that have occurred as well as the occurrence of a threat to the internal security of the GDR;
- Determining the movement of people and checking operationally important people;
- People and property searches;
- Obtaining evidence or comparative material; Participation in
- expert commissions.

4. Detection and clarification of operationally significant violations of security, order and discipline

The IM and GMS are to be used primarily for

- Personification of the polluter;
- Clarification of the personality of the perpetrator or suspicious person as well as their motives and objectives.

5. Detection and clarification of references to organizers and inspirers of anti-state activity in the area of operation, which take effect against the area of responsibility

With suitable IM, task and process-related political-operational work in or after the operational area must be guaranteed.

Through a differentiated and targeted use of these IMs, coordinated with the head office and the relevant main department, whose constant thorough review is of particular importance, information on

- Plans, intentions, measures, means and methods of the imperialist secret services, other enemy centers, organizations and forces directed against the area of responsibility;
- Persons who are used to realize the hostile plans and intentions of the imperialist secret services, other hostile centers, organizations and forces as well as the possibilities (routes, connections, contacts, etc.) which are misused or used for this purpose;
- Methods and conditions for concealing enemy activity.

On the basis of these general directions of deployment, taking into account the specific political-operational situation in the area of responsibility as well as the possibilities and capabilities of the IM and GMS, it must be determined in which specific directions the respective IM or GMS is to be deployed.

1.2.2 The intensification of the use of the IM and GMS and the acquisition of IM For the development of perspective starting materials for operational processes, the intensification of the use of the IM and GMS should be concentrated on:

- the constant elaboration as well as the personal and factual use of all operational possibilities available to the IM and GMS as well as the targeted creation of new operational possibilities;
- the targeted political and operational qualification of the IM and GMS and their personal and factual assignment and instruction;
- the development and use of knowledgeable IMs (expert IMs) who can help determine the cause and provide further clarification in the case of complicated issues;
- the ability of the IM, in particular to

- Detection and recognition of operationally important information and facts, independent and correct reaction in all political-operational situations,
- Applying and mastering qualified, evolving operational legends,
- Tracing and securing evidence,
- immediate personal commitment to preventive prevention of damage, dangers or other serious consequences of hostile negative actions.

For IMs that can be used to develop raw materials for operational processes, the plan documents, the processing concepts for the political-operational focus areas and the annual assessments of the IM according to guideline no Realization of the necessary basic political-operational tasks and measures to be determined.

Based on the results of the inventory, in particular those IMs who have favorable prerequisites are to be obtained in order to further qualify the work on the enemy and to close the identified gaps.

- to penetrate the conspiracy of the enemy, to enlighten hostile-negative and fluctuating persons or groups of persons, to gain their trust and to keep them under effective control;
- expose hostile-negative actions;
- Recognize complicated incidents, facts and processes, assess them correctly and effectively contribute to their clarification.

The heads of the operational service units have to ensure that

- it is specifically determined where and to solve which tasks which IMs are to be won;
- When searching, selecting and recruiting, the operational employees concentrate on people who meet the specified requirements;
- the possibilities of the service unit for the qualified acquisition of IM are used on all sides and imaginatively;
- the methods for obtaining IM are used that are necessary according to the educational results.

1.3 The targeted use of further operational forces, means and methods for the development of starting materials for operational processes

In connection with the targeted use of the IM and GMS, all other operational forces, resources and methods must be deployed appropriately and sensibly in accordance with the political and operational requirements for the purposeful development of starting materials for operational processes.

This applies in particular to:

- operational investigations and observations to identify and review indications of hostile-negative actions;
- operational search measures, especially in cross-border traffic; the possibilities of
- departments M, postal customs investigation and 26⁵ to identify and clear up hostile-negative connections;
- operational-technical and forensic-technical means and methods;
- the information stores of departments M and postal customs investigation, the service units of line VI on cross-border traffic and the information stores of other service units;

- the possibilities of the main department IX or the departments IX of the district administrations / administrations within the framework
of preliminary investigations,
of incident investigations,
of audit procedures according to § 95 (2) StPO,
participation in the operational process processing,
the use of special possibilities for investigative work.

The use of these forces, means and methods to develop raw materials for operational processes is to be combined with the use of the IM and GMS or has to create the prerequisites for the targeted use of the IM and GMS.

In addition, information from the IM and GMS must be checked, completed and condensed, and evidence must be developed.

1.4 The constant political and operational assessment, targeted review and analytical processing of the information obtained

All information that is developed as a result of the deployment of the IM and GMS and other operational forces, means and methods for the political-operational penetration of the area of responsibility must be constantly assessed for their political-operational and legal significance, checked and checked by a qualified to condense analytical, especially comparative work. In doing so, all notices must be included that are developed in the course of incident investigations, operational investigations, political-operational security reviews of persons, operational observations and the implementation of operational actions.

1.4.1 Tasks in the implementation of the meetings

The political-operational assessment, review, analysis and consolidation of the information available and to be compiled requires:

⁵ Department 26: Telephone Surveillance.

1. The evaluation of the political-operational and legal significance

At the meeting, it must be worked out whether the information obtained contains indications of hostile-negative actions or other actions that endanger the internal security of the GDR.

In particular, it should be worked out to what extent the information provided contains references to

- People or groups of people who engage in a hostile-negative activity, have a hostile-negative attitude or on whom the enemy is concentrating or could concentrate;
- imperialist secret services, other hostile centers, organizations and forces acting primarily against the area of responsibility;
- People in the political-operational priority areas that are particularly important for ensuring security and order and the fulfillment of tasks, and opportunities for the enemy to influence these groups of people and to become effective;
- favorable conditions and circumstances for the implementation and concealment of hostile-negative acts;
- People who, using their options, endanger security and order by their actions, including failure to fulfill obligations;

2. Checking for completeness and political and operational measures to complete it

At the meeting, all possibilities of the IM and GMS are to be used in order to obtain information that is as complete as possible or to work out information on the political and operational measures with which the subsequent completion can take place. The profound and comprehensive skimming of the IM and GMS, with special attention to objective reporting, requires qualified receipt and processing of the information by the operative employee. The 8 W-questions (when, where, what, how, with what, why, who, whom) are an important aid.

3. Checking for truthfulness and possibilities for creating evidence

Through targeted questioning of the IM and GMS, it is above all to be clarified

- how they came into possession of the information;
- which relationships exist between the IM and GMS and the persons or facts mentioned in the information;
- who still has knowledge of the subject of the information; who could be interviewed;
- what opportunities could be used to create evidence;

4. the definition of further political and operational measures

On the basis of the assessment of the information obtained, a decision must be made - as far as necessary and possible - which further orders and instructions are to be given to the IM and GMS or which immediate measures are to be initiated, e.g. B. in the case of indications of leaving the GDR illegally, of anti-subversive human trafficking, of terrorist attacks and acts and of significant danger.

1.4.2. Tasks of the operational employees and managers in evaluating the meetings When evaluating the meetings, it must be checked and documented whether the order was carried out and which further political-operational measures, in particular for placing orders and instructing the IM and GMS to be determined. It must be secured

- comparing the information obtained and checking it further.
It must be checked whether the information obtained corresponds to the order and the information requirements and whether information is already available on the person / matter. It must be ensured that the VSH card index and the Kerbloch card index of the service unit, as far as necessary, the central information storage of the MfS and the information storage of the other state bodies are used;
- the initiation of the necessary political and operational measures to implement the obligation to report immediately in the case of operationally particularly important information in accordance with the applicable official regulations and instructions; the decision on the use of the information.
- It must be ensured that all operationally important information is recorded and processed in such a way that storage and continuous compression is possible;
- the decision on political-operational measures to be initiated.
It must be determined how the information contained in the information is to be clarified and which political-operational measures are necessary for this. This decision relates in particular to the deployment of operational forces, means and methods, the initiation of operational identity checks (OPK), the creation of operational processes, the initiation of preventive and damage-preventive measures and the development of information for leading party and state officials .

1.4.3 Tasks of the evaluators The evaluators must ensure:

- the constant comparison of all newly obtained information with the information already stored in the service unit, in particular with regard to constituent elements, verbin

statements and information on persons with the aim of working out basic materials for operational processes;

- the complete recording and storage of all information obtained on people and facts;
- the systematic analytical work with the stored information in accordance with the current political and operational requirements;
- The transfer of the information obtained as a result of the analytical work, which can be the basis for the development of starting materials for operational processes, with concrete suggestions for further processing to the responsible manager;
- keeping an overview of the results of further political and operational work on the development of source materials and keeping the head of the service unit informed about the status of processing.

1.5 The initiation and use of the operational identity check to develop starting materials for operational processes

The heads of the operational service units must ensure that the OPK is purposefully used or applied to the development of raw materials for operational processes and incorporated into this process.

On the basis of the analysis of the operationally significant clues about people and on the basis of precise control objectives, such political and operational measures are to be defined and implemented that are aimed at developing suspicions of hostile activity. Preventive and damage-preventive measures are to be implemented during the processing of the OPK. The managers and employees have to solve the following tasks for the consistent use of the possibilities of the OPK for the development of raw materials for operational processes:

1. The OPK is to concentrate on the operationally important people and groups of people, primarily in the political-operational priority areas.

For this purpose, the orientations given in the official regulations and instructions to persons or groups of persons according to the concrete political and operational situation in the area of responsibility must be implemented and specified by the manager.

Precise guidelines must be used to ensure that, with the aim of developing raw materials for operational processes, those persons are controlled who actually have operationally significant indications of hostile negative actions.

2. The IM and GMS are to be used purposefully to clarify the operationally important clues about people.

For the purposeful processing of the OPK and for the clarification of the operationally significant clues, the IMs are to be used offensively, primarily by establishing confidential relationships.

The IM and GMS have to work out - based on the specific content and character of the operationally significant indicators actually present -:

- Information to clarify actions and behavior of persons in the work, living and leisure areas, from which further indications of possible hostile activity emerge, e.g. B.
 - about specific violations of law or duty,
 - about statements and reactions that indicate hostile-negative attitudes and goals,
 - about the spread of revisionist and anti-socialist theories, about the repeated attacks on military objects,
 - the recognizable interest in facts, objects, research results that are to be kept secret or in the manner in which the border is secured;
- Information to clarify the scope and content of operationally important connections and contacts, in particular
 - to people from non-socialist countries and West Berlin,
 - to persons who have connections and contacts to non-socialist countries and West Berlin,
 - to privileged persons who are in the GDR,
 - to operationally important persons with whom connections and contacts were established during business or private trips abroad,
 - to people or groups of people with a hostile / negative attitude within the GDR;
- Information about the development of the personality and their political attitudes, especially with regard to their significance and effectiveness for the current or expected actions or behavior of these people,
z. B. over
 - the origin and development as well as the attitude of the persons to the socialist state and society,
 - behavior during political climaxes and in tense situations,
 - the contradictory occurrence of the people in the work, living and leisure areas and their causes,

- the specific attitude towards the performance of assigned tasks and legal obligations,
- the characteristics of character and will that can have a promoting or inhibiting influence on the decision to behave in a manner that is not socially appropriate and
- the social circle, especially with regard to its influence on the development of the personality and its political attitude as well as on the behavior of the person.

The heads of the operational service units - based on the control objectives - have to ensure constant control of the results of the OPK and are responsible for making the necessary decisions on the creation of operational processes in good time if the relevant requirements are met.

1.6 The cooperation between the operational service units to develop basic materials for operational processes

The main / independent departments have to exert influence and contribute to the development of operational processes with high security-political significance for the implementation of the politics of the party and state leadership. To this end, the MfS's operational units must work together according to the following principles:

1. On the basis of my official regulations and instructions as well as those of my deputies, the heads of the main / independent departments and the heads of the district administrations / administrations have to specify, in particular in the plan orientations or plan specifications,
 - where current or future security needs develop;
 - where in the political-operational priority areas or for processing which political-operational priority areas operational processes are to be developed;
 - On which specific enemy attacks as well as means and methods of enemy activity the political-operational work is to be focused on;
 - where which operational forces and resources are to be primarily deployed and created;
 - which operational methods are to be used to develop operational processes with a high level of security policy importance.
2. According to my order no. 299/65^{6th} the main / independent departments have to work out return information and after appropriate confirmation

^{6th} Order 299/65 on the organization of a uniform system of political-operational evaluation and information activities in the Ministry of State Security.

to the district administrations / administrations and - if necessary - to other main / independent departments.

This return information should be used in particular to focus on:

- new plans, intentions and measures of the imperialist secret services and other enemy centers, organizations and forces;
- new and expected directions of attack as well as means and methods of enemy activity;
- new possibilities and starting points that are used by the enemy to organize hostile activity;
- Proven operational forces, resources and methods for developing starting materials for operational processes.

3. The main / independent departments have direct practical support to the district administrations / administrations in the development of operational processes to focus on:

- the determination and political-operative penetration of the politically operative priority areas and the determination of the politically operative priorities;
- the development and qualification of the political-operational basic work in the political-operational priority areas;
- the political-operational and criminal assessment of source materials for operational processes with high security-political significance; the coordination of political-operational measures, the deployment and creation of suitable operational forces and resources as well as the elaboration of joint concepts for the development of source materials and for the processing of operational processes that are of great importance for security policy;
- the use of operational methods, especially operational legends and combinations;
- the qualification of analytical and comparative work in the politically operational priority areas;
- the coordination of the cooperation with central state organs and institutions, in particular with the organs of the Mdl and the customs administration of the GDR.

4th These political-operational tasks and measures defined for the main / independent departments are to be implemented by the specialist departments of the district administrations / administrations in accordance with the specific situation in the area of responsibility and implemented in cooperation with the district / property offices.

5. In accordance with the specifically defined responsibilities and operational possibilities, in

to coordinate information on operationally important persons and facts for the development of raw materials for operational processes. The information obtained is to be brought together at the responsible service units for the timely development of raw materials. The definition of the cooperation must - if necessary - take place in coordination specifications. The heads of the main / independent departments and district administrations / administrations must ensure that the necessary management prerequisites are in place and that all operational options are used on all sides.

- 6th The main department IX or the departments IX of the district administrations / administrations are to be involved in the development of basic materials for operational processes, with full compliance with the responsibility of the operational service unit concerned, if there are legally complex problems, in particular due to new forms of hostile activity.

The main department IX and the departments IX of the district administrations / administrations have differentiated information for the operational service units for the political-operational and criminal assessment of the source materials as well as for the creation and further processing of operational processes, especially for the development of the necessary evidence give.

- 7th The service units of lines VI and VIII as well as the departments M, Postzollfahndung, 26 and the special radio services of the MfS have all available options according to their responsibility and the specific information requirements specified by other operational service units for the development of source materials for operational processes in a targeted and consistent manner to use. The flow of information required for this is to be organized according to plan between the above service units and other operational service units.

- 8th. The measures required for the implementation of the cooperation between the operational service units of the MfS to develop basic materials for operational processes must be included in the relevant planning documents.

1.7 The use of the possibilities of the DVP and other organs of the Mdl as well as other state and economic governing organs, companies, combines and institutions as well as social organizations and forces for the development of raw materials for operational processes

1.7.1 Use of the possibilities of the service branches of the DVP and the other organs of the Mdl for the development of starting materials for operational processes

In compliance with the official regulations applicable in the DVP and the other organs of the Mdl, operational cooperation and mutual support must be implemented according to the following principles:

1. The operational units of the MfS responsible for defense work in the DVP and in the other organs of the Mdl as well as the service units of Line IX must ensure that all information about hostile-negative actions is constantly and timely accessible to the responsible service units of the MfS be made. Appropriate measures within the MfS as well as in operational cooperation with the DVP and the other organs of the Mdl are to be initiated for further processing and clarification in accordance with the political and operational needs.

2. The operational service units of the MfS responsible for defense work in the DVP and in the other organs of the Mdl influence the targeted use of forces, resources and methods of the DVP and the other organs of the Mdl to identify indications of hostile-negative actions to take, especially with the

- Investigation of general crime offenses; Control of selected groups
- of people;
- Processing of applications for release from citizenship of the GDR, relocation to non-socialist countries and West Berlin as well as marriage with people from non-socialist countries and West Berlin; Securing economically important objects;
-
- Securing of firearms, essential parts of firearms, ammunition, explosives, poisons and radioactive materials;
- Securing the border areas at the state border with the FRG and West Berlin; Ensuring
- security and order on and around the transit routes; Handling of the application and
- approval process for leaving and entering and the control of the entry of persons from non-socialist countries and West Berlin and their stay in the GDR and the contacts established in this context.

3. When investigating incidents, especially in the case of anonymous and pseudonymous threats of violence, violent crimes, fires, accidents and

Malfunctions, a coordinated procedure for the development of starting materials for operational processes must be guaranteed.

1.7.2 Use of the possibilities of other state and economic governing bodies, companies, combines and institutions as well as social organizations and forces

In order to use the possibilities of other state and economic management organs, companies, combines and institutions as well as social organizations and forces for the development of basic materials for operational processes, effective mutual support between them and the responsible operational service units must be provided for solving the specific tasks assigned to them respectively. This is to be guaranteed by

1. the support of the heads or responsible functionaries of state and economic governing bodies, companies, combines and institutions as well as social organizations in ensuring security, order and discipline, the development of socialist consciousness of the working people and the further raising of the mass vigilance . For this purpose, according to my basic instructions on the information activities of the MfS to leading party and state officials, the operational service units provide them with information about

- new or expected enemy attacks as well as basic knowledge of the enemy image in accordance with the political-operational requirements,
- Influences and effects of political-ideological diversion, hostile contact policy / contact activity and hostile base activity, existing favorable conditions and circumstances for the endangerment of security and order,
- existing dangers and damage that has occurred,
- factors and phenomena that inhibit social development as a whole

to be transmitted in compliance with the instructed forms. Among other things, this information must be suitable for initiating and implementing the necessary measures to increase security, order and discipline. In addition, targeted public relations measures are to be carried out in accordance with the political and operational situation, while maintaining conspiracy and secrecy;

2. the constant development and use of the possibilities of state and economic governing bodies, companies, combines and institutions as well as social organizations and forces for the development of raw materials for operational processes by the responsible operational service units, in particular

- in obtaining and securing information and evidence on operationally significant persons, incidents and facts,
- for the security policy assessment of complicated processes and issues, especially through the targeted involvement of experts and appraisers,
- to create evidence that can be used in criminal proceedings on the basis of unofficial information and evidence,
- for the detection, restriction and elimination of conditions and circumstances conducive to criminal offenses of dangers and damage or causes of damage; Working out possibilities of hostile-negative forces (paths, connections, contacts) for the realization of hostile-negative actions, to create a higher effectiveness of the use of the IM and GMS, in particular through the use of operational legends and combinations as well as other operational means and methods ;

3. The exploitation and expansion of the specific possibilities of the security officers, officers in special operations and IM in key positions to actively influence the realization of the cooperation for the development of raw materials for operational processes.

1.8 The political-operational and criminal law assessment of source materials and the prerequisite for creating operational processes

The political-operational and criminal law assessment of source materials must create the prerequisites for well-founded decisions on the creation of operational processes, including the definition of necessary measures. On the basis of the information and evidence obtained, the politically operational and criminal law assessment must always be based on the assumption that the creation, processing and conclusion of operational processes will make an offensive contribution to the implementation of the politics of the party and government in the class dispute with the To achieve imperialism, to achieve a high security-political efficiency and to change the political-operational situation in the area of responsibility positively. The political-operational and criminal law assessment must therefore always be implemented as a unit.

1.8.1 Requirements for the political-operational and criminal law assessment of source materials for operational processes

1. In order to work out their political and operational significance, the starting materials must be assessed according to the following questions:
 - What are the aims of the presumably hostile actions? In what way are security and order in the area of responsibility endangered?

- What is the significance of the areas, processes, groups and persons attacked for the development of the GDR and socialist integration?
 - Which plans, intentions and measures of the imperialist secret services, other hostile centers, organizations and forces are recognizable and which new aspects become visible overall?
 - Have the source materials been developed in the political-operational focus areas or for processing political-operational focus areas, what concrete relationships exist with these?
 - Do new political-operational focal points emerge from the source materials or the need to specify recognized political-operational focal points?
 - How are the class struggle situation and the concrete political-operational situation influenced by the presumably hostile actions in the area of responsibility?
 - What is the position and influence of the suspect, what possibilities do they have to cause harm and danger?
 - What connections and contacts do you have with operationally important people inside and outside the GDR?
 - What means and methods of execution and concealment are used by the suspects?
2. Source materials are to be assessed with regard to criminal liability according to the following questions:
- Which criminal offenses may have been violated by which actions of the suspects?
 - What information and evidence is available on the objective and subjective requirements of the violated criminal offenses? (What has already been proven, what has not yet?)
 - What stage of development and what forms of participation are there?
 - Can the person being processed have committed the suspected crime?
 - What are the possible grounds for suspension or exclusion of the sentence?
3. For further purposeful processing of the starting material, the following should be checked:
- Which operational forces and resources are available for further processing, are required or need to be created?
 - With which other service units of the MfS and which state and economic management bodies, companies, combines and institutions so

how social organizations and forces are to work together for what purpose?

- Which other information sources and stores are to be used for further processing?
- What immediate measures are necessary, in particular for preserving evidence, preventing damage and changing the political and operational situation?

4. The main department IX or the departments IX of the district administrations / administrations are to be involved if the exhaustion of the expertise or the means and possibilities of the investigation work is necessary from the beginning,

z. B.

- with legally complex problems;
- when it is necessary to carry out criminal procedural measures and to involve the public prosecutor;
- in the case of specific problems in providing evidence such as securing evidence, specifications for documentation, etc.;
- if complicated problems of leaching out IM occur from the beginning and must be continued in the investigation;
- if the facts contain information and evidence of planned or prepared violent crimes such as assassinations, hostage-taking, kidnapping or terrorist crimes;
- for specific offenses such as people smuggling in transit traffic;
- if diplomats or other privileged persons or persons in important professional or social positions are or can be involved in the commission of the offense.

1.8.2 Political-operational and criminal law prerequisites for creating operational processes and necessary managerial decisions

Operational processes are to be created if the inspection is suspected

of crimes according to the first or second chapter of the StGB - special part

- or an offense of general criminality, which has a high degree of social danger and is closely related to state crimes or for the processing of which the MfS is responsible in accordance with my official regulations and instructions,

by one or more known or unknown persons.

The suspicion of one of the above-mentioned criminal offenses exists if, based on an objective, factual, critical and fact-related assessment, it can be concluded with probability that one or more criminal offenses have been violated from verified unofficial or official information and evidence.

The existence of the suspicion must be derived from the entirety of all checked information and evidence on the objective and subjective circumstances of the offense, including the perpetrator's personality. All indicting and exonerating instructions must be taken into account.

In order to work out the suspicion of a violation of objective elements of the offense, as a rule, in particular, verified information and evidence on such objective circumstances of the crime must be available, from which information can be derived

- the possible direction of attack, the attacked objects and areas, social conditions, phenomena and processes;
- the type and manner of the commission, the means and methods of carrying out and covering up the crime;
- the consequences brought about or aimed at by the act, such as material and non-material damage or dangerous situations;
- on the causal connection between the action and the effects brought about;
- at the place and time of the crime, with special consideration of the class struggle situation and the political-operational situation;
- on contacts and connections of the suspects to imperialist secret services, other hostile centers, organizations and forces, especially in the case of state crimes.

In order to work out the subjective elements of the offense, as a rule, in particular, checked information and evidence must be available from which the existence of such subjective circumstances of the crime can be inferred as:

- culpable action in the form of willful intent or negligence; culpable violation of legal
- obligations;
- culpable causing of consequences;
- the motives underlying the act and the goals pursued by the act;
- Responsibility of the suspect or responsibility in the case of suspect juveniles.

In order to work out the suspicion, essential aspects of the suspect's personality and its development must be clarified, in particular:

- hostile or negative attitude to the socialist state and society;
- occupational and social position and qualification;
- Personality traits such as greed, talkativeness, careerism etc., which can be points of contact for imperialist secret services, other hostile centers, organizations and forces;

- Deviation from social behavior or from generally customary social or individual behavior or habits; Connections, contacts and relationships with other people inside and outside of the
- GDR, which can have a negative impact on personal development and thus on the commission of the crime.

At the time of the decision to start an operational case, it is not necessary that verified information and evidence be available for all objective and subjective circumstances of the crime.

This requires verified information and evidence from which fact-related information about the suspicion of the commission of a criminal offense can be obtained.

Particularly appropriate information and evidence include

qualified and verified IM, observation and investigation reports; Information from departments M, PZF and 26 as well as special radio services; seized or copied operationally important documents, crime scene reports or criminologically secured traces or tools; Statements of detainees, prisoners and witnesses; Survey protocols; expert assessments; Notes, notifications and notifications from state and economic management bodies, companies, combines and institutions, social organizations and forces as well as citizens of the GDR and other states.

In the political-operational and criminal law assessment of the source materials and the resulting examination of the political-operational and criminal law requirements for the creation of operational processes, the secured knowledge and experience of directions and objects of attack, plans, intentions and measures as well as forces The means and methods of the enemy, specific inspection methods, in particular those of camouflage and concealment, as well as information on the political-operational situation in the area of responsibility and the personality of the suspects, to be thoroughly analytically processed and for a politically-operationally justified decision with the information contained in the source material Relate facts.

Makes the decision about creating operational transactions

- in the main / independent departments of the head / deputy,
- in the district administrations / administrations of the manager / deputy operational.

The following must be submitted to the responsible manager for confirmation of the creation of an operational process:

- the decision to invest, the
- opening report,
- the first operational plan.

The opening report must contain:

- the results of the political-operational and criminal law assessment of the source material,
- the justification of the political-operational and criminal law requirements for the investment,
- the objectives to be achieved in the operational process.

Approval must be obtained for processing people of foreign nationality or citizens of the GDR in special positions and functions:

- in the case of privileged persons and the staff of foreign representations in the GDR as well as accredited correspondents from the head of Department II,
- in the case of citizens of friendly socialist states from the security organs of these states via the responsible main departments through department X,
- For citizens of the GDR in special positions or functions, such as members of the People's Chamber, the district and district assemblies, nomenclature cadres of the state apparatus, the party and other social organizations according to the nomenclature, by me, my responsible deputies or the head of the district administration / administration or the responsible main department. Central operational processes (ZOV) and associated sub-processes (TV) are to be created if

the attacked areas, processes or persons and the suspect persons belong to the area of responsibility of several main / independent departments, district administrations / administrations or several service units of a main / independent department, district administration / administration and therefore the cooperation of these service units becomes necessary or as a result of the The extent and complexity of hostile activity require the concentration of operational forces and resources from several service units.

Decisions on creating central operational processes and sub-processes are made by me or my responsible deputy.

The creation of further sub-processes for already existing central operational processes must be agreed between the head of the main / independent department or district administration / administration in charge of the central operational process and the head of the main / independent department or district administration / administration to decide whose area of responsibility the sub-process is to be carried out.

The manager decides on the creation of central operational processes and sub-processes that are to be carried out exclusively in the area of responsibility of a main / independent department or district administration / administration.

2. The purposeful processing and completion of operational processes

2.1 The political-operational objectives of processing operational transactions

The political-operational objectives of processing operational processes are as follows:

- through an offensive, focused and fact-based processing to provide the necessary evidence to prove the urgent suspicion of one or more state crimes or a general criminal offense;
- beginning with and in the course of the entire processing in good time to limit or prevent as far as possible the recognized or expected socially damaging effects of the subversive activity or other criminal offenses;
- to determine, prove and as far as possible to limit or eliminate the conditions and circumstances that trigger or favor a state hostile activity or other criminal offenses during processing;
- The plans, intentions and measures of imperialist secret services, other hostile centers, organizations and forces are comprehensively and continuously cleared up and their implementation is prevented in good time and effectively by means of appropriately targeted political and operational measures.

It must be ensured that these general political and operational objectives are implemented in the operational processes. For this purpose, concrete, fact-related and feasible goals must be specified for each operational process in the opening report and in the operational plans.

2.2 Working with operational plans

The operational plan is the basic and binding document for the rational, effective and focused management and implementation of the processing of operational processes.

The operational plan must be drawn up on the basis of the concrete, political, operational and criminal assessment of the source materials or operational processes and the versions drawn up.

The operational plans must contain specifications about:

- the goals to be achieved in the operational process and the intermediate goals derived from them;
- the necessary information and evidence to be obtained primarily to prove the urgent suspicion, as well as the political and operational tasks and measures required for their development;
- the operational forces to be used for this purpose - especially unofficial employees - as well as operational resources;

- the most appropriate operational-tactical approach and behavior of the operational forces to provide evidence, whereby a well-coordinated and combined use of the operational forces, means and methods must be ensured in a feasible and controllable manner and such proven political operational measures have priority as Introducing IM, breaking out IM candidates, operational legends and combinations; political and operational measures to effectively limit hostile negative actions, to largely eliminate favorable conditions and circumstances and to
- prevent damage;
- the effective cooperation with other operational service units or the possibly necessary cooperation with state and business management bodies, companies, combines and institutions as well as social organizations and forces;
- any necessary use of temporary working groups;
- the dates and responsibilities for the implementation and control of the political and operational measures.

The managers have to ensure that every operational process is processed on the basis of an operational plan that corresponds to the current status of processing. The operational employees are to be instructed and monitored in the development of operational plans.

The managers are responsible for ensuring the content and timing of the defined political and operational measures, the ongoing political and operational and criminal assessment of the information obtained, the preparation of interim assessments (status reports) and the resulting political and operational tasks and measures.

In the event of new findings about the hostile-negative actions or changed conditions in the processing of operational processes, new operational plans must be drawn up in good time or the existing ones specified more precisely.

Operational plans must be confirmed:

- in the main departments by the heads of the departments or their deputies;
- in the independent departments by the heads of the sub-departments / units or their deputies;
- in the district administrations / administrations by the heads of the departments, district / property offices or their deputies.

In the case of operational processes that are personally guided and controlled by a higher-level manager, the operational plans must be confirmed by him.

2.3 Working with IM

The main forces for the processing of operational processes are the IMs, as they can penetrate most comprehensively into the conspiracy of the enemy, expose them to a large extent, have a targeted effect on the suspicious persons and gain such information and evidence that an offensive, fact-based processing of operational processes can be obtained guarantee. With the targeted use of IM, the prerequisites for the effective use of operational resources and methods must be created.

The constant qualification of working with IM in accordance with guideline no. 1/68 is the decisive prerequisite for the successful processing of operational processes.

The possibilities of the GMS are to be used in a targeted manner within the framework of the basic tasks specified for you in guideline No. 1/68 to solve the tasks set out below for working with IM.

2.3.1 The directions of deployment of the IM for a successful, qualified and aggressive processing of operational processes

General directions of use are:

1. Development of information and evidence to prove the urgent suspicion of criminal offenses

Information and evidence (incriminating and exonerating) are to be developed by the IM

- The objective criteria such as behavior, the manner in which the crime was carried out, the means and methods of preparation, execution and concealment, the place and time of the actions (scene of the crime, location, place of occurrence of the consequences), the damaging effects, the causality between the action and consequences that have occurred, further planned or already prepared crimes,
- the subjective criteria such as culpable non-compliance with legal obligations, attitudes and attitudes of the suspect regarding their breach of duty, motives for action, intended goals, attitudes to the harmful effects, circumstances that exclude or could impair culpable action,
- for all-round clarification of the personality, in particular its political development, attitude to the socialist state in the past and present, its appearance in public and in the work, living and leisure areas, its professional qualifications and position, their connections to other people in and outside of the GDR, lifestyle habits and character traits.

2. Assessment and appraisal of complicated issues by competent IM (expert IM), in particular for the preparation and assessment of evidence

Expert IM (Expert IM) are to be used for the examination, expert assessment and assessment of operational information and materials, in particular with regard to their evidential value. If necessary, they can also be used in expert commissions. In particular, they have to work out information and establish and assess evidence that provides information about

- Causes of incidents, the extent of the damaging effects, the causal relationship between actions and consequences, the qualifications of the suspect, the hazards caused and the damaging effects that are still to be expected,
- Legal obligations, their violation by the suspect and the objective ways in which they can be complied with.

3. Introduction and implementation of damage-preventing and preventive measures The IMs are to be used for

- Obtaining information about the existing favorable conditions and circumstances for hostile-negative actions and their exploitation by the enemy as well as damage and effects caused or expected by hostile-negative actions,
- immediate prevention of hostile-negative acts, especially those with great social danger such as acts of terrorism and other violent crimes,
- Preparation of concrete measures to restore or maintain security and order as well as to initiate damage-preventing and preventive measures according to their possibilities while maintaining conspiracy,
- Political-operational control of the effectiveness of the measures introduced by the other security organs or the relevant state and economic governing organs, companies, combines, institutions and social organizations and forces, to determine the reaction of suspicious persons and to secure possible evidence.

4. Enlightenment of imperialist secret services, other hostile centers, organizations and forces

Suitable IMs are to be used to investigate identified or possible connections of the suspect to imperialist secret services, other hostile centers, organizations and forces.

This IM has to be used primarily for

- Providing evidence of hostile activity - creating and securing unofficial and official evidence,
- Identification and clarification of the imperialist secret services, other hostile centers, organizations and forces, their plans as much as possible,

Intentions, measures, means and methods as well as the persons they are involved in the hostile activity or whose involvement is intended,

- Limitation and elimination of hostile influence and the conditions and circumstances that favor them, especially in areas of political operational focus.

5. Realization of other necessary political-operational measures to process operational processes

The IM must be used to solve the various tasks required to process operational processes, such as

- comprehensive control of suspicious persons in their movement areas (work, living and leisure areas),
- Creation of prerequisites for the introduction of IM or the breaking out of people from hostile groups, for operational legends and combinations,
- Enabling the use of operative technology, forensic-technical means and methods, operative observation, conspiratorial searches,
- Preparation of the deployment of expert commissions, procurement of documents and other documents for evidence purposes from various facilities and institutions.

On the basis of these general directions of deployment, the specific directions of deployment of the respective IM for processing the operational process must be determined. The specific operational conditions and the relationship between the IM and the suspicious persons required to solve the politically operational tasks must be taken into account.

2.3.2 The development of the requirements for the IM to be used for processing operational processes

For the successful processing of operational processes, high demands are to be made on the IM to be used.

The IM must

- have such a professional or social position and have specific personality traits that are of interest to the persons to be dealt with,
- be able to unobtrusively bring oneself into the field of view of the persons to be processed, to establish contact with them and to gain their trust,
- be as mentally equal or superior to the people to be worked on; solve the tasks assigned to them reliably, honestly, with initiative and perseverance,

- have sufficient and concrete knowledge of the enemy image and of the essential requirements for the criminal offenses to be clarified,
- be familiar with the basic rules of conspiracy to fight the enemy, master skilled work with operational legends and properly respond to the enemy's verification measures,
- have such an ability to assess and react that they can make correct and quick operational decisions in certain situations within the scope of their mandate and their line of conduct,
- be characterized by courage, steadfastness, willingness to work, loyalty and firm ties to the MfS in order to successfully solve the tasks of fighting enemies and to be armed against hostile-negative influences,
- have special knowledge to the required extent - in accordance with the specifics of the offense.

In accordance with these requirements, a real set of requirements must be developed for each IM to be selected and used for processing an operational process. This has to take into account the intended direction of operation, the information and evidence to be obtained, the specifics of the crime, the required relationship to the suspect, their personality ^{7th} as well as the specific conditions of use.

The requirement profile is the basis for the selection of the IM or IM candidates and their process-related political-ideological and political-operational education and qualification.

When selecting and deploying the IM, it must be determined which essential prerequisites they must have and which they must be trained in preparing for their deployment and in working together to solve specific tasks in the operational process.

Above all, the IMs who have worked out the source material and who already have contacts or points of contact with the suspect should be included in the shortlist ^{8th}, and those IMs that have already been used successfully across the site.

2.3.3 The introduction of IM in the processing of operational processes

The introduction of IM in the processing of operational processes should be geared towards

- To introduce qualified, verified IMs that are suitable for the political-operational tasks to be solved in the respective operational process to the suspicious persons with the aim of gaining their trust in order to obtain information and evidence about planned, prepared or carried out hostile-negative actions as well as means and Methods of action by suspects and

^{7th} Printing errors corrected by hand according to the enclosed correction sheet. Printing errors

^{8th} corrected by hand according to the enclosed correction sheet.

to develop their backers in good time and to create the prerequisites for preventive prevention or limitation of hostile-negative actions.

When introducing IM, the following principles should be assumed:

- The introduction of IM must be carefully prepared at the beginning of the processing of operational processes.
- The number of IMs to be introduced in the processing of an operational process is always dependent on the specific political-operational requirements and conditions of proof of hostile activity, the quality of the IMs available and in the interest of successful work as well as the guarantee of conspiracy and Establish confidentiality.
- The establishment of contact and the consolidation of the relationship must take place in such a way that the interests, in particular the interests hostile to the state, are addressed in such a way that the initiatives to maintain and strengthen the relationship are taken by the suspect and the IMs introduced Their tactically intelligent, natural, believably motivated behavior that is tailored to these people will win their trust.
- The introduction of the IM can only be regarded as successful if concrete results for realizing the objectives of the operational processes have been developed, such as B. Information and evidence about planned, prepared or already carried out crimes, connections of the suspects to imperialist secret services, other enemy centers, organizations and forces in the area of operations, hostile-negative attitudes, goals and motives that are related to the operationally significant actions and omissions of the suspect persons.

When preparing and realizing the introduction of IM, it is important to ensure above all

- the careful selection of the IMs suitable for the introduction, which have the requirements and skills that correspond to the requirements and which can be created at short notice,
- the elaboration of operational legends that can be expanded and developed, which enable the IM to be introduced to act aggressively on the suspect, as well as the necessary lines of conduct and the operational combinations required to establish and consolidate contacts,
- the careful preparation of the selected IM, in particular the adjustment to the personality as well as the thinking and behavior of the suspect persons, to the specific operating conditions, the acquisition of the operational legends and necessary lines of conduct, the imparting of the necessary knowledge about the concrete enemy image, the specifics of the crime and the possible inspection methods, preparation for inspections by the suspect,

- creating the necessary conditions for the introduction of IM, such as
 - z. B. the temporary exemption from professional or social tasks, the creation of suitable situations and opportunities for establishing contact, the procurement and coverage of documents and materials
 - and the like

After concrete political and operational results have been achieved, intensive efforts must continue to be made to strengthen the trust of the suspects in the IMs introduced. Through the behavior of the IM and the application of suitable operational legends and combinations, facts must be created for the suspect that they value as evidence of reliability and trust in their interests. When selecting the IM, in the process of introduction and working on the operational process, the possibilities of their subsequent removal must be constantly observed and created according to plan.

The heads of the operational service units have to guide and actively support the operational employees in the selection of the IM to be introduced and in the preparation and implementation of the political-operational measures required for the introduction.

2.3.4 Breaking people out of hostile groups

The breaking out is to be directed towards

- To advertise people from hostile groups for unofficial cooperation in order to penetrate into the conspiracy of the group and to develop information and evidence about planned, prepared or carried out hostile acts as well as the means and methods of their action, points of contact and conditions for a necessary paralysis and restriction of hostile actions or to dissolve groups. Breaking out as an offensive method is particularly necessary or to be checked if
 - because of the suspicion of committing a criminal offense with high social danger, a short-term investigation is absolutely necessary,
 - there is little or no chance of success for the introduction of IM, contradictions or differences between the suspects exist or can be created that offer favorable conditions for advertising. The breaking out must be prepared thoroughly. Above all, this requires:
- The analysis of the operational process, in particular the group structure, such as the positions of the individual group members and their activity, the intensity and extent of the mutual relationships of the group members, the efforts of suspects to withdraw from the group and the motive for this, the character the personal relationships, the scope and intensity of the offenses, and the evidence available.

In doing so, taking into account all risk factors, the persons must be identified who are objectively able to compile the necessary information and evidence and who have favorable opportunities for conspiratorial contact, advertising and informal cooperation;

- the further education and verification of persons who are shortlisted for breaking out, in particular with regard to their suitability for informal collaboration. Have to stand in the foreground
basic ideological, moral and character attitudes that determine action, such as attitudes towards socialist society, attitudes towards the activities of the MfS, attitudes towards hostile activities, attitudes towards or ties to people and groups of people;

Personality traits such as will, reliability, discipline, etc., which are decisive for typical modes of reaction;

Personality traits from which the effectiveness of the existing compromising material can be inferred or the basis and starting point for the creation of effective compromising material through operative combinations;

- the choice of the person to break out;
it has to take place as a result of the conscientious and expert analysis of the operational process and the further targeted clarification and review. The candidate is to select the person with whom the greatest political and operational effectiveness can be achieved in accordance with the specific objectives of the respective operational process, taking into account an acceptable risk, and who offers the appropriate prerequisites for cooperation with the MfS.

The political-operational measures required for establishing contact or advertising and the operational-tactical procedure are to be specified in the proposal to break out.

This must contain:

- the results achieved in processing and the assessment of the political and operational situation in the operational process;
- the necessity and purpose of breaking out;
- the advertising plan - place and time, manner of advertising, use of compromising material, versions of the candidate's reactions and the corresponding decision options of the MfS, review measures during advertising, targeted control measures immediately after the advertising, legends of withdrawal, first order placement and instruction, responsibility;
- the risk factors and the resulting political and operational measures for the further processing of the operational process.

In the case of persons who have already committed criminal offenses or who, in the course of the questioning, are strongly suspected of having committed criminal offenses, the responsible investigative department must be consulted before advertising. The suggestion to break out must be confirmed by the heads / deputies of the main / independent departments or the district administrations / administrations. The heads of the operational service units must particularly support the preparation and implementation of the break out.

Once the proposal has been confirmed, the candidate can be referred to the conspiratorial questionnaire. This must be designed in such a way that the possibility of implementing other political and operational measures including criminal prosecution remains open until the obligation is reached. The decisions required for this must be obtained from the manager authorized to confirm.

Depending on the political and operational requirements, it is also possible to carry out the advertising under suitable operational legends, which ensure that the candidate does not recognize the actual intentions and goals of the MfS. After the probation and verification of the IM advertised under the legend, the IM is to be used to process the operational process.

After breaking out, more political and operational measures are to be carried out to check the IM. Hostile-negative attitudes are to be broken down systematically, purposefully and in a differentiated manner.

The principles of breaking out of hostile groups are to be applied analogously to the recruitment of persons who are not themselves active in a hostile manner, but who have close personal relationships with suspects, or to persons from negative groups.

In order to effectively deal with operational processes in which enemy groups are dealt with who carry out their enemy activities on behalf of secret services, other enemy centers, organizations and forces, over-recruitment must be carried out as far as possible. At the same time, within the framework of the processing of operational processes, the prerequisites for the offensive processing of the imperialist secret services, other hostile centers, organizations and forces must be created.

2.3.5 Basic questions regarding the cooperation with the IM during their assignment to process operational processes

The qualified cooperation with the IM, in particular the specific person-related and factual order placement, instruction, reporting and evaluation of the reports, must constantly be aimed at the offensive realization of the political-operational goals of the operational processes.

When placing orders and giving instructions, the following principles must be observed:

- The assignment of the order to the deployed IM must be based in particular on the specific directions of use specified for them.
- The IMs deployed have to receive the information they need to fulfill their orders while ensuring conspiracy and secrecy. In accordance with the political and operational requirements, the goal of their deployment must be declared vis-à-vis the IM, especially vis-à-vis IM, whose reliability has not yet been fully proven.
- For the fulfillment of the orders, the IMs have to be given behavioral guidelines which allow them to react relatively independently and according to the situation in the interest of achieving optimal results. They must be equipped with operational legends that enable the targeted fulfillment of the orders placed and the necessary leeway for adapting to unforeseen situations or reactions of the suspect.
- The IMs need to know as exactly as possible the specific conditions under which they have to carry out the orders.
- The IM must be certain that everything will be done by the MfS to ensure their safety and conspiracy.
- The orders, lines of conduct and operational legends for the IMs used in an operative process must be carefully coordinated in order to achieve a high level of political and operational effectiveness for all IMs, to enable them to be checked and to reduce the risk of the IMs being deconspired to the suspicious persons or exclude the IM from each other.
- The orders, behavior lines and operational legends must be designed in such a way that the IM can be removed at any time. The socialist legality is to be strictly adhered to. The IM must not provoke or incite criminal offenses. The apparent involvement in criminal offenses of suspicious persons may only take place to the extent that it is inevitable to achieve the processing objectives. It requires a thorough examination and confirmation from the head of the service unit.
- A stable connection to the IM used in the operational process must be guaranteed, which corresponds to the specific requirements of the processing of the respective operational process and enables the IM to establish an immediate connection to the MfS.

A concrete, truthful report covering all details relevant to the processing of the operational process must be guaranteed on the implementation of the orders placed with the IM and the political operational results achieved.

After the meeting, the further and thorough evaluation of the information obtained must take place immediately.

Above all, the following should be worked out:

- Are there any indications of hostile-negative actions that must be reported immediately or that require immediate action to be taken?
- What is possibly to be used as evidence, or what information is there, where and under what circumstances evidence could be secured? Which political-operational measures result from the information of the IM for the further processing of the operational process or for the placing of orders and instructions?
- Are there any signs of a violation of conspiracy and secrecy and what are the consequences for the handling of the operative process?
- Are there any inconsistencies in the information provided by the IM with regard to persons, descriptions of persons, descriptions of the situation, successes or failures, results achieved, reactions from suspects or other persons or inconsistencies with information that is already available and what could be the causes?

2.4 Working with operational legends and operational combinations

2.4.1 Principles of the preparation and application of operational legends for processing operational processes

The aim of the application of operational legends is the effective use of IM and other forces, means and methods for offensive processing of operational processes, in particular

- intruding into the enemy's conspiracy, in which suspicious persons are induced by given motives, reasons, explanations and statements to reveal clues about their hostile-negative intentions, actions and connections,
- ensuring the conspiracy and secrecy of the goals, intentions and measures as well as the forces, means and methods of the MfS.

The heads of the operational service units must ensure that the creative work with operational legends to solve the diverse political-operational tasks for processing operational processes in their area of responsibility is constantly and systematically qualified.

When working out and applying operational legends, the following principles in particular must be assumed:

- The basis for the elaboration of operational legends is the concrete objective pursued with the application of the operational legends, the analysis of the operative process as well as the thorough knowledge of the personality of the target person, including their peculiarities, peculiarities and customs. Operational legends must be suitable for addressing the
- behavior-determining interests of the target persons in order to become behavior-effective.

- Operational legends must be based largely on natural and verifiable foundations, correspond to the usual customs of life, and be as uncomplicated and believable as possible.
- The effective application of operational legends presupposes a thorough knowledge of the possibilities, skills, characteristics and political-operational experience of the IM or the people who are to work with the operational legends. They must be suitable for their respective sponsor and capable of development and expansion. Before they are used, they must be discussed with the IM to be used and, if necessary, specified on this basis.
- The use of operational legends, the results achieved with them and any complications that have occurred must be precisely documented.
- The schematic and repeated application of operational legends should be avoided.

2.4.2 Principles of the preparation and application of operative combinations for the processing of operative processes

The aim of using operational combinations is the offensive, accelerated processing of operational processes, in particular

- the influence of complex, mutually dependent and complementary as well as coordinated political-operational measures on the suspected persons in order to induce them to react, allow conclusions to be drawn about carried out or planned anti-state activity and enable the securing or documentation of corresponding evidence,
- the accelerated and effective solution of other complicated political and operational tasks while maintaining conspiracy about the goals, intentions and measures, forces, means and methods of the MfS.

The heads of the operational service units have to influence that through the targeted application of qualified operational combinations, a higher quality of the processing of operational processes is achieved in their area of responsibility. You have to give the operational employees the necessary guidance and support in the development and implementation of operational combinations.

Operative combinations are particularly to be used

- For complicated advertisements, to introduce IM to the processed persons, to introduce IM into the processing of operational processes, to break out of people from hostile groups, to bring IMs together, to check IMs used and to remove IM from the Be processing of operational processes;
- to obtain compromising or otherwise significant operational material, including the procurement and documentation of necessary comparison material;

- to prepare for the application and to apply operational, technical and forensic means and methods;
- to secure evidence that can be used in criminal proceedings or to create it on the basis of unofficial evidence and information;
- to prevent planned crimes; to identify
- unknown perpetrators;
- to ensure conspiratorial arrests and searches; to disinformation the opponent.
-

When working out and using operative combinations, the following principles in particular must be assumed:

- The prerequisite for the implementation of operative combinations is the availability of sufficient and verified information about the facts or the suspected persons and their thorough analysis.

Building on this, the respective operational combination must be worked out, including the objective and determination of the right time for its implementation. In doing so, well-founded versions of the suspects' possible reactions to the measures taken by the MfS must be developed and assessed politically and operationally.

- The operative combinations including the objectives are to be advised by the responsible manager and operative employees. The schematic and repeated use of operative combinations should be avoided. A justifiable relationship between effort and expected benefit must be ensured and it must be assumed that the results are the decisive criterion for the value of operational combinations.
- The main component of the operative combinations has to be the targeted, legendary use of reliable, proven, experienced and for the solution of the intended tasks suitable IM, which has to be exactly coordinated with the use of other operative means and methods.

The selection, preparation and deployment of the IM has to be done according to the principles and regulations of section 2.3 of this guideline. Operative combinations must largely be based

- on natural circumstances and conditions. The artificially created circumstances must be adapted to the actual circumstances, build on them and appear natural and withstand possible tests. These requirements are also to be placed on the operational legends to be used in the context of operational combinations.

The immediate preparation and implementation of the operative combinations must take place on the basis of the plan to be drawn up.

The plan, built according to the logical sequence of the process and to be coordinated with the service units involved, must contain:

- the goal of the operational combination;
- the brief description of the facts necessary to understand the operative combination;
- the concrete political and operational tasks and measures;
- the complex, time-coordinated interaction of the political and operational measures;
- Specifications for the use of the IM, its tasks and behavioral guidelines, specifications for the connection system;
- the responsibilities and deadlines. He must be confirmed:
- in the main departments by the heads of the departments or their deputies;
- in the independent departments by the heads of the sub-departments / units or their deputies;
- in the district administration / administrations by the heads of the departments, district / property offices or their deputies.

In the case of operational processes that are personally guided and controlled by a higher-level manager, the plans must be confirmed by him.

In politically and operationally significant cases, the plans must be submitted to me or my respective responsible representative for confirmation.

The tight, uniform management of the implementation of the operative combinations ensures the constant assessment of the status of the implementation of the respective operative combination, the constant, effective and smooth cooperation of the forces involved and the means used as well as the safe handling of any complications that may arise .

The results of the operative combinations must be carefully evaluated. It must be ensured that the favorable conditions that have arisen are used purposefully and aggressively for the further operational processing of the suspicious persons, the causes of failures are comprehensively uncovered and the necessary measures to overcome them are implemented.

2.5 The targeted use of further operational forces, resources and methods as well as the involvement of the forces of other state and economic leaders of the organs, companies, combines and institutions as well as social organizations and forces to handle operational processes

The single-minded processing of operational processes in connection with the use of the IM and the work with operational legends and combinations requires the appropriate use of all other forces, means and methods available to the MfS as well as the use of the possibilities of other state and economy

governing bodies, companies, combines and institutions as well as social organizations and forces.

Their differentiated use is expediently combined with the use of the IM and particularly geared towards

- Create the prerequisites for the targeted and effective use of IM;
- Review and complete information developed by IM and other operational forces, resources and methods;
- To develop evidence of the hostile actions of suspects. When making decisions about their use, the following should be assumed:
 - of the political-operational requirements, taking into account the expenditure in relation to the [to] expected results;
 - of the official regulations and directives applicable to the deployment of these forces, means and methods.

The following forces, resources and methods in particular must be used to process operational processes:

- operational investigations and observations by forces of the service units of line VIII and the incident processing service unit;
- Operational searches for people and objects with the involvement of the search command group or the possibilities of the service units of the line VI, the DVP and the organs of the customs administration of the GDR;
- Conspiratorial searches, in particular for the determination and documentation of evidence;
- operational resources of departments M, post customs investigation and 26, in particular for the identification, investigation and documentation of hostile-negative connections as well as intelligence resources and methods;
- operational means and methods of service units of Line IX and other lines, such as B. the specialists in the search for documents and the specialists of the service units of line XVIII for dealing with fires and faults; Possibilities of special radio services of the MfS;
-
- operational and technical means for monitoring people and facilities as well as communication links;
- forensic means and methods;
- special operational-technical means and methods of the operational-technical sector, e.g. B. for the preparation of investigation reports, expert reports and appraisals;
- Use of the information stores of the service units of line VI on cross-border traffic as well as the information stores of other service units.

The possibilities of the DVP, the customs administration of the GDR, other state and economic governing bodies, companies, combines and institutions as well as social organizations and forces must also be used purposefully to obtain the information required to process operational processes.

2.6 The application of measures of decomposition

2.6.1 Objectives and areas of application of decomposition measures

Decomposition measures are aimed at creating, exploiting and strengthening such contradictions or differences between hostile-negative forces by which they fragment, paralyze, disorganize and isolate and prevent their hostile-negative actions including their effects restricted or completely prevented.

Depending on the specific situation under hostile-negative forces, the attitude of certain people with whom there are corresponding points of contact must be influenced to the effect that they give up their hostile-negative positions and further positive influence is possible.

Decomposition measures can be directed against groups, groups and organizations as well as against individual persons and can be used as a relatively independent way of closing operational processes or in connection with other types of closing.

The heads of the operational service units must ensure that, if politically operationally necessary, decomposition measures are used as a direct component of the offensive handling of operational processes.

Decomposition measures are to be used in particular:

- if the necessary evidence of the existence of a state crime or another criminal offense has been developed in the processing of operational processes and the respective operational process is not to be concluded with criminal measures for political and political-operational reasons in the interest of realizing greater social benefit;
- in connection with the implementation of criminal law measures, in particular to break up hostile groups as well as to restrict or prevent the mass effectiveness of hostile-negative acts;
- for the effective preventive fight against state-hostile activity and other hostile-negative acts, such as B.
 - to prevent negative groups from becoming anti-subversive,
 - to limit the effectiveness of politically corrosive views or actions that cause damage,
 - against organizers and backers of anti-state activity in the operational area;

- against persons, groups of persons and organizations from which activities to disseminate or promote political-ideological diversion and other subversive measures against the GDR originate.

2.6.2 Forms, means and methods of decomposition

The determination of the dismantling measures to be carried out must be based on the exact assessment of the results achieved in processing the respective operational process, in particular the starting points developed and the individuality of the persons processed and depending on the respective objective to be achieved.

Proven applicable forms of decomposition are:

- systematic discrediting of public reputation, prestige and prestige on the basis of connected, true, verifiable and discrediting as well as untrue, credible, non-refutable and thus also discrediting information;
- systematic organization of professional and social failures to undermine the self-confidence of individuals;
- purposeful undermining of beliefs related to certain ideals, role models, etc. and the generation of doubts about personal perspective;
- Generating distrust and mutual suspicion within groups, groups and organizations;
- Creation or exploitation and reinforcement of rivalries within groups, groups and organizations through targeted exploitation of personal weaknesses of individual members;
- Dealing with groups, groups and organizations with their internal problems with the aim of restricting their hostile-negative actions;
- Local and temporal prohibition or restriction of mutual relations between the members of a group, grouping or organization on the basis of applicable legal provisions, e.g. B. through job ties, assignment of locally distant jobs, etc.

When carrying out decomposition measures, priority should be given to using reliable, proven IMs suitable for solving these tasks.

Proven means and methods of decomposition are:

- the introduction or use of IM, legendary as couriers of the head office, confidants of the head of the group, superordinate persons, representatives of the responsible offices in the operational area, other liaison persons etc .;

- the use of anonymous or pseudonymous letters, telegrams, telephone calls, etc., compromising photos, e.g. B. of past or faked encounters;
- the targeted dissemination of rumors about specific persons in a group, group or organization;
- targeted indiscretions or the pretense of a deconspiracy of defense measures of the Stasi;
- summoning people to government agencies or social organizations for credible or unbelievable reasons.

These means and methods are to be applied, expanded and further developed creatively and in a differentiated manner in accordance with the specific conditions of the respective operative process.

2.6.3 The procedure for the preparation and implementation of decomposition measures

The prerequisite and basis for the elaboration of effective decomposition measures is a thorough analysis of the operative process, in particular to identify suitable points of contact, such as existing contradictions, differences or compromising material.

On the basis of the results of the analysis, the exact target of the decomposition must be determined.

Thorough preparation and planning of the decomposition measures must be carried out in accordance with the defined objective. In the preparation - if necessary - while maintaining conspiracy, the IMs used or to be used for processing the respective operative process are to be included.

The plans for the implementation of disintegration measures require confirmation by the head of the respective main / independent department or district administration / administration.

Plans to implement decomposition measures against

- Organizations, groups, groups or individuals in the operational area,
- People in important central positions in society or with international or mass influence

as well as in other politically and operationally particularly significant cases are to be submitted to me or my respective responsible deputy for confirmation.

The implementation of the decomposition measures is to be managed uniformly and tightly. This includes constant unofficial control of their results and effects. The results must be precisely documented.

According to the political-operational necessity, further political-operational control measures are to be defined and implemented.

2.7 Removing the IM from the processing of operational transactions

2.7.1 Objectives and principles of extraction

The removal must ensure that

- the conspiracy of the IM deployed in the operational process is guaranteed and they are retained for further work on the enemy or even better opportunities are created for this;
- By using and creating favorable circumstances, conditions or situations, the enemy is permanently distracted from the IM and seeks and finds the causes for the exposure in the contexts aimed at by the MfS;
- the fact and the manner in which the IM is deployed towards the processed persons, their surroundings, the hostile positions and the public is conspiratorial and kept secret, thereby ensuring the personal security of the IM and further strengthening their trust in the MfS.

The removal of the IM is to be seen and implemented as a constant and open task in all operational processes. Prepare and plan as early as possible.

Depending on the processing status, the removal is continuous and purposeful, to be achieved above all through a well thought-out order placement, instruction and assignment of the IM. On the basis of the precise reporting of the IM, all information that is or may have significance for the extraction must be worked out and carefully used. Based on the specifics of the operative process, the following is to be assessed or determined:

- the further political-operational deployment and the most important tasks of the IM to be separated;
- the nature, concrete content and depth of the relationship of trust between the IM and the suspected persons, the circumstances and conditions under which the IMs compiled the operationally significant information and evidence of an anti-state activity or other criminal act, the type and extent of the apparent involvement of the IM in crime;
- the character and probative value of the evidence developed and thus the evidence as a whole;
- the possible use of third parties or the creation of favorable circumstances to distract from the IM to be removed.

The managers have to ensure that the release of the deployed IM is guaranteed in the course of the processing and completion of operational processes.

2.7.2 Variants of extraction

Proven variants of detachment are:

- organizing the seemingly accidental finding or discovery of evidence;

- the use of IM to make witnesses criminal⁹ To induce actions to report or notify the protection and security authorities or reliable official forces;
- the initiation of criminal procedural measures for the commission of general criminal offenses as well as the exploitation of knowledge about the violation of legal norms outside of criminal law in order to obtain evidence of anti-state activity;
- the use of decomposition to sustainably distract from IM to be extracted;
- the dissemination of evidence to a wider audience; interviewing suspects in
- accordance with Section 95 (2) StPO;
- the arrest of processed persons after previous interrogation of third parties.

These variants are to be applied creatively individually or in combination, based on the specific conditions of the respective operational process.

The responsible managers are responsible for confirming the specific procedure for detachment and the necessary political and operational measures. You have to ensure that the necessary coordination is carried out with the investigation department and other specialist departments.

2.8 The completion of the processing of operational transactions

2.8.1 The objective of closing operational transactions and the types of closing

The conclusion of operational processes always has to serve the political interests of the GDR. The political-operational prerequisites required for this must be created in the processing and at the time of completion or used to the maximum. The managers have to ensure that even while the operational processes are being processed, all possibilities to strengthen the GDR, e.g. B. to support measures in foreign policy, in foreign trade, in the economic and scientific-technical field are recognized in good time and used purposefully.

The aim of the degree must be:

- to prove and prevent the present and already recognized anti-state activity or other criminal offenses as comprehensively as possible¹⁰;
- to largely eliminate their specific causes, favorable conditions and circumstances by influencing the responsible state and economic governance bodies, companies, combines and institutions as well as social organizations;

⁹ Printing errors corrected by hand according to the enclosed correction sheet.

¹⁰ Printing errors corrected by hand according to the enclosed correction sheet.

- to effectively prevent further hostile-negative actions and to initiate or increase measures to guarantee or restore security and order in the respective area;
- to guarantee internal security in the area of responsibility as much as possible and thus to help implement the policies of the party and government as a whole. Types of completion of operational processes are in particular:
 - Initiation of preliminary proceedings with or without detention; Over-advertising;
 -
 - Application of decomposition measures;
 - Recruitment;
 - Use of the incident material as compromising material against corporations, companies, institutions, state organs of the FRG, other non-socialist states or West Berlin;
 - Initiation of specific measures against privileged persons;
 - Transfer of material about general crime offenses to other protection and security agencies;
- Public evaluation or handover of material to leading party and state officials, combined with suggestions for preventive measures to ensure security and order.

For each transaction closure, those types of closure or partial deals are to be specified that bring the greatest security benefit.

When instructing and monitoring the processing of operational processes, taking into account the applicable legal provisions, the managers must constantly check whether the political-operational objectives have been implemented with the necessary quality and to the necessary extent, in particular by providing evidence of the urgent suspicion of a criminal offense or existing or threatened dangerous situations, such as planned terrorist crimes, violent border breaches, hostage-taking, make the conclusion necessary.

The main departments or departments of the district administrations / administrations have to support the process-processing service units in the completion of operational processes. This must be done, in particular through active participation in the preparation of evidence, in the deployment of operational forces and resources, and through joint determination and implementation of the most politically and operationally expedient type of contract.

2.8.2 The political-operational and criminal law assessment of the operational processes to be concluded

In the stage of the conclusion of operational processes is a concentrated examination and evaluation of the entire material according to political-operational, criminal and

criminal procedural aspects in order to assess the prerequisites for the conclusion and to determine the type of conclusion.

For this it is necessary - especially taking into account the concrete class struggle situation or the political-operational situation:

- to penetrate the incident material analytically in order to determine its political-operational and criminal significance;
- to work out the factuality of the material developed in the operational process, the nature and scope of the criminal act, its socially damaging consequences, the means and methods of its commission and concealment as well as the aims aimed at with the act (objective and subjective requirements, forms of participation, stages of development);
- to assess the evidence in terms of incriminating and exonerating (criminal procedural usable and unofficial, direct and indirect evidence, probative value, evidence options);
- To examine the possibility of separating out the IM or the status of the political and operational measures already initiated;
- to assess the suspect from all sides as well as the content and scope of his connections.

As a result of this assessment, the leader has to propose or decide with which objective the concrete operational process is to be concluded, which type of conclusion has the greatest social effectiveness and which politically operational benefit effect with it for further work on the enemy as well as the ideological one. Offensive of the party can be achieved.

When operational processes are concluded, the service unit responsible for processing the process - in coordination with the relevant specialist departments - must prepare a final report. This must show the essential political-operational and criminal law results achieved, in particular the evidence created and the status achieved in clarifying the grounds for suspicion and the removal of the IM, as well as justifying the proposal for the conclusion and the type of conclusion to be selected.

In the final report, planned further political-operational measures, such as the initiation of the OPK, travel bans, etc., must be evident for the persons included in the operational process. The final report must enable the information obtained to be efficiently retrieved for future political-operational work. The final report and the suggestions contained therein are confirmed

- in the main / independent departments by the heads or their deputies,
- in the district administrations / administrations by the heads of the district administrations / administrations or their operational deputies.

2.8.3 The realization of the conclusion of operational processes and the implementation of political-operational measures after the conclusion of the process

The completion of operational processes must be prepared and carried out in such a way that the intended objective is achieved with high quality. The operational-tactical procedure required for this, in particular for the development of further evidence, for loss prevention, for the removal of favorable conditions and circumstances must be determined and confirmed by the manager.

The initiation of investigative proceedings is to be proposed to the head of the main / independent department or district administration / administration by the investigation departments and justified. The initiation of investigations is ordered by the head of main department IX or the district administration / administration.

The investigation department is responsible for carrying out investigative proceedings and must strictly comply with the applicable statutory provisions, in particular the StPO. The service units handling the case and the relevant specialist departments must, in particular, determine with the investigation department when investigative proceedings are initiated:

- Manner of arrest or arrest, search and seizure;
- political-operational circumstances to be considered in the first interrogation in order to be ready to give evidence quickly;
- necessary political-operational measures to control the suspect in preliminary proceedings without detention;
- the immediate review of statements and other measures to develop and secure further evidence that can be used in criminal proceedings as well as the flow of information on all questions relating to the investigation; the continuation of the separation of the IM;
-
- Political-operational measures to prevent damage and to determine the reactions of the imperialist secret services, other hostile centers, organizations and forces, the backers, inspirers, accomplices, relatives, etc.

If necessary, such decisions are also to be made for other types of degree.

In principle, consultations with the investigation department must be carried out for all types of conclusion. The tasks to be solved with and after the completion of operational processes to ensure security and order as well as to remove favorable conditions and circumstances have to be the focus. To this end, the heads of the service units responsible for processing cases, together with the responsible party leaderships and the state heads,

to make relevant determinations and to influence that the necessary measures are worked out and implemented.

The measures introduced are to be controlled and supported by the deployment of operational staff and resources in order to ensure that the desired goals are achieved even after the process has been completed.

The investigation department is responsible for carrying out criminal procedural measures or legal sanctions as well as the increased involvement of the public prosecutor in the context of legal supervision. The transfer of materials to other protective and security organs, other state and economic executive organs, companies, combines and institutions as well as social organizations has to be carried out in accordance with my basic instructions on the information activities of the MfS to leading party and state officials.

All materials from the areas of the main / independent departments and particularly significant operational materials from the areas of the district administrations / administrations are to be submitted to me for decision.

The results of important political and operational measures in connection with the conclusion of operational processes must be documented in the operational processes.

2.8.4 Political-operational and criminal law reasons for discontinuing the processing of operational processes

The processing of operational transactions must be stopped if

- the grounds for suspicion that led to the creation of the operational process are clearly and verifiably refuted and thus neither criminal offenses nor other legal violations have been committed or the prerequisites for criminal prosecution are no longer met (such as statute of limitations, death of the suspect, incapacity) or
- Objectively, there are currently no opportunities to clarify the grounds for suspicion.

The heads of the service units in charge of the operational processes must ensure that the reasons for the discontinuation of operational processes are conscientiously examined, necessary preventive measures or measures serving compliance / restoration of legality are initiated or initiated and final reports are prepared. The decision about hiring is made by the manager who is authorized to make decisions about creating and closing operational processes. At the same time, it is to be checked whether a public evaluation or the transfer of material to leading party and state officials should take place in relation to established legal violations, defects, grievances etc.

Discontinued operational processes are, in particular when new operationally significant facts about the person and circumstances become known, changes in the political-operational situation and the resulting security requirements by the

The service unit that processed the respective operational process or in whose area of responsibility the person arises must be reassessed and checked for the need to resume processing.

3. Basic tasks of the manager to qualify the development and processing of operational processes

3.1 Analysis of the development and processing of operational processes in the area of responsibility as well as the definition of necessary measures

The results achieved in the development and processing of operational processes in the area of responsibility are to be assessed continuously and in connection with the preparation of the annual analysis.

The goals and tasks of the qualification of the development and processing of operational processes are to be included in the work plans of the managers according to guideline No. 1/70.

The analytical work must in particular assess:

- the development of basic materials for operational processes and their security policy significance;
- the quality of the evidence, in particular the political and operational value and the usability of the unofficial and official evidence obtained for an effective fight against the enemy;
- successful completion of operational processes in accordance with the types of completion listed in section 2.8 and the resulting security policy effect; intelligence results obtained about the
- secret services, other enemy centers, organizations and forces as well as their plans, intentions, measures, means and methods;
- results achieved in the preventive defense or restriction of planned hostile-negative actions as well as in preventing damage and maintaining or restoring security and order;
- the effectiveness of the deployment of operational forces, means and methods as well as the processing time spent in relation to the social benefit achieved;
- the reasons for discontinuing operational processes;
- Recognized weaknesses in the processing of operational processes, in the preventive prevention of damage and dangers and recognized causes for the non-implementation of specified objectives for the development and processing of operational processes;
- the changes in the number of operational processes and in the importance of security policy compared to the previous year;

- the effectiveness of implemented measures to qualify the processing of operational processes;
- the work carried out by the managers and operational employees in the development and processing of operational processes, the results of cooperation with other service units and cooperation with other bodies.

The knowledge and experience gained in the development and processing of operational processes as well as through the thorough evaluation of completed operational processes must be carefully saved and used for planning and organizing the political-operational work, especially for

- the further qualification of the development and processing of operational processes as well as
- the systematic, process-related qualification and development of operational employees

to use constantly.

Each completed operational process must be assessed with regard to its suitability for training operational employees.

The operational main / independent departments are responsible for the central preparation of suitable operational processes for training purposes - provided the necessary coordination is guaranteed - in close cooperation with the main management and training department and the Potsdam Law School.

Outstanding achievements by operational employees in the development and processing of operational processes and valuable contributions from other service units are to be recognized accordingly.

3.2 Guarantee of constant influence on the purposeful development and processing of operational processes in the area of responsibility

The managers must constantly ensure that the development of perspective starting materials takes place primarily in the political-operational focus areas and for the processing of political-operational focus areas and that the operational processes - especially those with high security policy importance - are processed quickly and with high quality.

In particular, this requires:

- Ensuring control and an overview of the development of starting materials for operational processes;
- Differentiation of the operational processes in the area of responsibility according to their security-political importance;
- Determination of the deployment of operational forces, concentration of the most qualified operational forces on the operational processes with high security-political importance,

Use of temporary working groups in accordance with the political and operational requirements;

- Definition of the responsibility for the guidance and control of the operational employees responsible for the processing of the operational processes, definition of the personal control and guidance in operational processes with high security policy importance;
- Timely and careful decisions about the creation, about necessary measures for rapid processing and the completion of operational processes; precise control of the quality and
- timely implementation of the political-operational measures specified in the operational plans;
- Support of the operational employees in the selection and use of the IM as well as the development and application of operational legends and combinations;
- Organization of cooperation and necessary consultations with the service units of Line IX;
- Organizing the necessary cooperation with other service units and interaction with other bodies;
- Ensuring the constant evaluation of the information gathered in the process of developing and processing operational transactions about the actions of the opponent, in particular about new plans, intentions, means and methods and objects of attack, as well as about emerging risks and effects. Immediate notification of the responsible service units and the responsible party and state organs as well as initiation of the necessary preventive measures; Ensuring the implementation of necessary political-operational measures after the completion of operational
- processes such as B. ensuring the security of the IM, the control of the implementation of measures to remove favorable conditions and circumstances, the further control of connections of the persons processed in the operational process, etc.

The heads of the main / independent departments and district administrations / administrations have to support the operational service units effectively in their line or in their area of responsibility in the processing of operational processes with high security-political importance, in particular through

- constant guidance and control of processing;
- the use of qualified, experienced operational staff and IM; the use of special
- forces and resources.

The heads of the service units who process central operational processes must, in cooperation with the heads of the service units who process sub-processes, ensure that all necessary political-operational measures are coordinated and carried out precisely and that the necessary information relationships are implemented.

3.3 Organization of cooperation with the security organs of the friendly socialist states

If cooperation with the security organs of the friendly socialist states is necessary in the development and processing of operational processes, the heads of the operational service units have requests to the security organs of the friendly socialist states

- for the implementation of political-operational measures by the security organs of the friendly socialist states,
- for the joint implementation of political-operational measures,
- for the approval of these security organs to involve citizens of these states in the processing of operational processes or in unofficial and official cooperation

to be directed to department X after consultation with the head of the responsible service unit.

The handover of political-operational information on persons and issues that has been developed in the process of developing and processing operational procedures, for the further evaluation and processing of which the security organs of the friendly socialist states are responsible, has to take place analogously.

Requests for legal assistance to the security organs of friendly socialist states (arrest, search, interrogation, search and securing of other criminal procedural evidence) must be coordinated with Department IX in good time. Search requests are to be initiated via the search command group after consultation with Main Department IX and handed over to Department X.

Requests for arrest require my confirmation.

Requests relating to the use of operational technology or operational observation by the security organs of friendly socialist states as well as requests in other politically and operationally particularly significant cases require confirmation by me or my respective responsible deputy.

4. Final provisions

- 4.1 The registration of operational processes, the recording of persons and objects on the basis of operational processes and the management of the process files must be carried out in accordance with the 1st implementation provision of this guideline.
- 4.2 This guideline is to be kept personally by the heads of the operational service units.
Evidence must be provided of the inspection.
- 4.3 This guideline comes into force on 1.1.1976.

Richtlinie 1/76 zur Bearbeitung Operativer Vorgänge

Die Richtlinie 1/76 regelte die Arbeit mit Operativen Vorgängen (OV). In diesem Zuge konnten auch Maßnahmen der "Zersetzung" angewendet werden, die politische Gegner des SED-Regimes verunsichern sollten

Die Richtlinie 1/76 regelte das geheimpolizeiliche Vorgehen der Stasi gegen politische Gegner in Operativen Vorgängen (OV). Ausgangspunkt dafür waren zumeist Hinweise auf strafrechtlich relevante Verstöße gegen DDR-Recht. Das MfS ermittelte daraufhin gegen die betreffende Person und erkundigte sich über familiäre Umfeld sowie den Freundes- und Kollegenkreis und holte weitere Informationen ein.

Nach einer klaren Abfolge fertigte das MfS sogenannte "Maßnahmepläne" an. Darin wurde beispielsweise festgelegt, Maßnahmen der "Zersetzung" zu ergreifen (siehe Abschnitt 2.6.: Die Anwendung von Maßnahmen der Zersetzung). Indem beispielsweise unzutreffende Gerüchte gestreut wurden, sollte etwa das Selbstvertrauen einer Person zerstört oder der Betreffende in den Augen seines Umfeldes diskreditiert werden.

Zersetzungsmaßnahmen kamen vor allem dann zur Anwendung, wenn eine Verhaftung aus politischen Gründen nicht opportun erschien.


Signatur: BStU, MfS, AGM, Nr. 198, Bl. 307-367

Metadaten

Diensteinheit: Minister für
Staatssicherheit

Datum: 1.1.1976

Richtlinie 1/76 zur Bearbeitung Operativer Vorgänge



Signatur: BStU, MfS, AGM, Nr. 198, Bl. 307-367

Blatt 307

Richtlinie 1/76 zur Bearbeitung Operativer Vorgänge

1295 213176

GVS 100/76

7. + 30 . Ausf. 10.3.1

Blatt

Absender MfS/BdL	Empfänger
a	b
c	d

Betreff RL 1/76

7. fiedler 11.08.88

BSU
000308

Inventur abgestimmt

19. 76 Str.	19. 82 Wö.
19. 78 Zi/di	19. 13 Nov 1986 Seidne
19. 81 Lic	19. 14 Jan 1988 Wö. (7.)
19. 81 di. (11 Ex.)	19. -3 Feb. 1988 Seid (11.)
19. 82 di. (11.)	19.

K 760 1073 500.0

8.75.

Signatur: BStU, MfS, AGM, Nr. 198, BL 307-367

Blatt 308


Richtlinie 1/76 zur Bearbeitung Operativer Vorgänge

Bereich		Ausf.	Blatt	Unterschr./Dat./Uhrzeit
BStU	4	Ausf.	Blatt	10.3.86
000309	11	Ausf.	Blatt	
		Ausf.	Blatt	
		Ausf.	Blatt	
		Ausf.	Blatt	
		Ausf.	Blatt	
		Ausf.	Blatt	
		Ausf.	Blatt	
		Ausf.	Blatt	
		Ausf.	Blatt	
		Ausf.	Blatt	
		Ausf.	Blatt	

Signatur: BStU, MfS, AGM, Nr. 198, Bl. 307-367

Blatt 309


Richtlinie 1/76 zur Bearbeitung Operativer Vorgänge



Signatur: BStU, MfS, AGM, Nr. 198, Bl. 307-367

Blatt 310

Richtlinie 1/76 zur Bearbeitung Operativer Vorgänge



Signatur: BStU, MfS, AGM, Nr. 198, Bl. 307-367

Blatt 311

Richtlinie 1/76 zur Bearbeitung Operativer Vorgänge

- 3 -		GVS MfS 008 - 100/76
		BStU
		000312
Gliederung	Seite	
Präambel	7	
1. Die zielstrebige Entwicklung Operativer Vorgänge	9	
1.1. Die systematische, schwerpunktbezogene Erarbeitung von Ausgangsmaterialien für Operative Vorgänge mit hoher sicherheitspolitischer Bedeutung	9	
1.2. Der qualifizierte Einsatz der IM und GMS zur Entwicklung von Ausgangsmaterialien für Operative Vorgänge	11	
1.2.1. Die Einsatzrichtungen der IM und GMS zur Entwicklung von Ausgangsmaterialien für Operative Vorgänge	11	
1.2.2. Die Intensivierung des Einsatzes der IM und GMS und die Gewinnung von IM	14	
1.3. Der zielgerichtete Einsatz weiterer operativer Kräfte, Mittel und Methoden zur Entwicklung von Ausgangsmaterialien für Operative Vorgänge	16	
1.4. Die ständige politisch-operative Einschätzung, zielgerichtete Überprüfung und analytische Verarbeitung der gewonnenen Informationen	16	
1.4.1. Aufgaben bei der Durchführung der Treffs	17	
1.4.2. Aufgaben der operativen Mitarbeiter und Leiter bei der Auswertung der Treffs	18	
1.4.3. Aufgaben der Auswerter	19	
1.5. Die Einleitung und Nutzung der operativen Personenkontrolle zur Entwicklung von Ausgangsmaterialien für Operative Vorgänge	19	
1.6. Die Zusammenarbeit der operativen Dienstseinheiten zur Entwicklung von Ausgangsmaterialien für Operative Vorgänge	21	

Richtlinie 1/76 zur Bearbeitung Operativer Vorgänge

BStU 000313	
- 4 -	
1.7. Die Nutzung der Möglichkeiten der DVP und anderer Organe des MdI sowie anderer Staats- und wirtschaftsleitender Organe, Betriebe, Kombinate und Einrichtungen sowie gesellschaftlicher Organisationen und Kräfte für die Entwicklung von Ausgangsmaterialien für Operative Vorgänge	23
1.7.1. Nutzung der Möglichkeiten der Dienstzweige der DVP und der anderen Organe des MdI für die Entwicklung von Ausgangsmaterialien für Operative Vorgänge	23
1.7.2. Nutzung der Möglichkeiten anderer Staats- und wirtschaftsleitender Organe, Betriebe, Kombinate und Einrichtungen sowie gesellschaftlicher Organisationen und Kräfte	24
1.8. Die politisch-operative und strafrechtliche Einschätzung von Ausgangsmaterialien und die Voraussetzungen für das Anlegen Operativer Vorgänge	25
1.8.1. Anforderungen an die politisch-operative und strafrechtliche Einschätzung von Ausgangsmaterialien für Operative Vorgänge	26
1.8.2. Politisch-operative und strafrechtliche Voraussetzungen für das Anlegen Operativer Vorgänge und erforderliche Leiterentscheidungen	27
2. Die zielstrebige Bearbeitung und der Abschluß Operativer Vorgänge	31
2.1. Die politisch-operativen Zielstellungen der Bearbeitung Operativer Vorgänge	31
2.2. Die Arbeit mit Operativplänen	31
2.3. Die Arbeit mit IM	33
2.3.1. Die Einsatzrichtungen der IM für eine erfolgreiche, qualifizierte und offensive Bearbeitung Operativer Vorgänge	33
2.3.2. Die Erarbeitung des Anforderungsbildes für die zur Bearbeitung Operativer Vorgänge einzusetzenden IM	35
2.3.3. Die Einführung von IM in die Bearbeitung Operativer Vorgänge	36
2.3.4. Das Herausbrechen von Personen aus feindlichen Gruppen	38
2.3.5. Grundfragen der Zusammenarbeit mit den IM während ihres Einsatzes zur Bearbeitung Operativer Vorgänge	40


Richtlinie 1/76 zur Bearbeitung Operativer Vorgänge

- 5 -		BSStU 000314 GVS MfS 008 - 100/76
2.4.	Die Arbeit mit operativen Legenden und operativen Kombinationen	42
2.4.1.	Grundsätze der Ausarbeitung und Anwendung operativer Legenden zur Bearbeitung Operativer Vorgänge	42
2.4.2.	Grundsätze der Ausarbeitung und Anwendung operativer Kombinationen zur Bearbeitung Operativer Vorgänge	43
2.5.	Der zielgerichtete Einsatz weiterer operativer Kräfte, Mittel und Methoden sowie die Einbeziehung von Kräften anderer Staats- und wirtschaftsleitender Organe, Betriebe, Kombinate und Einrichtungen sowie gesellschaftlicher Organisationen und Kräfte zur Bearbeitung Operativer Vorgänge	45
2.6.	Die Anwendung von Maßnahmen der Zersetzung	46
2.6.1.	Zielstellung und Anwendungsbereiche von Maßnahmen der Zersetzung	46
2.6.2.	Formen, Mittel und Methoden der Zersetzung	47
2.6.3.	Das Vorgehen bei der Ausarbeitung und Durchführung von Zersetzungsmaßnahmen	48
2.7.	Das Herauslösen der IM aus der Bearbeitung Operativer Vorgänge	49
2.7.1.	Ziele und Grundsätze des Herauslösens	49
2.7.2.	Varianten des Herauslösens	50
2.8.	Der Abschluß der Bearbeitung Operativer Vorgänge	51
2.8.1.	Das Ziel des Abschlusses Operativer Vorgänge und die Abschlußarten	51
2.8.2.	Die politisch-operative und strafrechtliche Einschätzung abzuschließender Operativer Vorgänge	52
2.8.3.	Die Realisierung des Abschlusses Operativer Vorgänge und die Durchführung politisch-operativer Maßnahmen nach dem Vorgangsabschluß	53
2.8.4.	Politisch-operative und strafrechtliche Gründe für das Einstellen der Bearbeitung Operativer Vorgänge	54

Richtlinie 1/76 zur Bearbeitung Operativer Vorgänge

BStU 000315	
- 6 -	
3.	Grundsätzliche Aufgaben der Leiter zur Qualifizierung der Entwicklung und Bearbeitung Operativer Vorgänge
	56
3.1.	Analysierung der Entwicklung und Bearbeitung Operativer Vorgänge im Verantwortungsbereich sowie die Festlegung erforderlicher Maßnahmen
	56
3.2.	Gewährleistung der ständigen Einflußnahme auf die zielstrebige Entwicklung und Bearbeitung Operativer Vorgänge im Verantwortungsbereich
	57
3.3.	Organisation des Zusammenwirkens mit den Sicherheitsorganen der befreundeten sozialistischen Staaten
	58
4.	Schlußbestimmungen
	59


Richtlinie 1/76 zur Bearbeitung Operativer Vorgänge



Signatur: BStU, MfS, AGM, Nr. 198, Bl. 307-367

Blatt 316


Richtlinie 1/76 zur Bearbeitung Operativer Vorgänge



Signatur: BStU, MfS, AGM, Nr. 198, Bl. 307-367


Blatt 317

Richtlinie 1/76 zur Bearbeitung Operativer Vorgänge




Signatur: BStU, MfS, AGM, Nr. 198, Bl. 307-367


Blatt 318

Richtlinie 1/76 zur Bearbeitung Operativer Vorgänge


Richtlinie 1/76 zur Bearbeitung Operativer Vorgänge




Richtlinie 1/76 zur Bearbeitung Operativer Vorgänge




Richtlinie 1/76 zur Bearbeitung Operativer Vorgänge




Richtlinie 1/76 zur Bearbeitung Operativer Vorgänge




Richtlinie 1/76 zur Bearbeitung Operativer Vorgänge


Richtlinie 1/76 zur Bearbeitung Operativer Vorgänge




Richtlinie 1/76 zur Bearbeitung Operativer Vorgänge



Richtlinie 1/76 zur Bearbeitung Operativer Vorgänge




Richtlinie 1/76 zur Bearbeitung Operativer Vorgänge




Signatur: BStU, MfS, AGM, Nr. 198, Bl. 307-367

Blatt 328


Richtlinie 1/76 zur Bearbeitung Operativer Vorgänge




Richtlinie 1/76 zur Bearbeitung Operativer Vorgänge




Richtlinie 1/76 zur Bearbeitung Operativer Vorgänge




Richtlinie 1/76 zur Bearbeitung Operativer Vorgänge




Richtlinie 1/76 zur Bearbeitung Operativer Vorgänge




Richtlinie 1/76 zur Bearbeitung Operativer Vorgänge



Richtlinie 1/76 zur Bearbeitung Operativer Vorgänge




Richtlinie 1/76 zur Bearbeitung Operativer Vorgänge




Signatur: BStU, MfS, AGM, Nr. 198, Bl. 307-367

Blatt 336


Richtlinie 1/76 zur Bearbeitung Operativer Vorgänge




Richtlinie 1/76 zur Bearbeitung Operativer Vorgänge




Richtlinie 1/76 zur Bearbeitung Operativer Vorgänge




Richtlinie 1/76 zur Bearbeitung Operativer Vorgänge



Richtlinie 1/76 zur Bearbeitung Operativer Vorgänge




Richtlinie 1/76 zur Bearbeitung Operativer Vorgänge



Signatur: BStU, MfS, AGM, Nr. 198, Bl. 307-367

Blatt 342


Richtlinie 1/76 zur Bearbeitung Operativer Vorgänge




Signatur: BStU, MfS, AGM, Nr. 198, Bl. 307-367

Blatt 343


Richtlinie 1/76 zur Bearbeitung Operativer Vorgänge




Richtlinie 1/76 zur Bearbeitung Operativer Vorgänge




Richtlinie 1/76 zur Bearbeitung Operativer Vorgänge




Richtlinie 1/76 zur Bearbeitung Operativer Vorgänge




Richtlinie 1/76 zur Bearbeitung Operativer Vorgänge




Richtlinie 1/76 zur Bearbeitung Operativer Vorgänge




Richtlinie 1/76 zur Bearbeitung Operativer Vorgänge




Richtlinie 1/76 zur Bearbeitung Operativer Vorgänge




Richtlinie 1/76 zur Bearbeitung Operativer Vorgänge




Richtlinie 1/76 zur Bearbeitung Operativer Vorgänge




Richtlinie 1/76 zur Bearbeitung Operativer Vorgänge




Richtlinie 1/76 zur Bearbeitung Operativer Vorgänge




Richtlinie 1/76 zur Bearbeitung Operativer Vorgänge




Richtlinie 1/76 zur Bearbeitung Operativer Vorgänge


Richtlinie 1/76 zur Bearbeitung Operativer Vorgänge




Richtlinie 1/76 zur Bearbeitung Operativer Vorgänge




Richtlinie 1/76 zur Bearbeitung Operativer Vorgänge




Richtlinie 1/76 zur Bearbeitung Operativer Vorgänge




Richtlinie 1/76 zur Bearbeitung Operativer Vorgänge




Richtlinie 1/76 zur Bearbeitung Operativer Vorgänge



Richtlinie 1/76 zur Bearbeitung Operativer Vorgänge


Richtlinie 1/76 zur Bearbeitung Operativer Vorgänge




Signatur: BStU, MfS, AGM, Nr. 198, Bl. 307-367

Blatt 365

Richtlinie 1/76 zur Bearbeitung Operativer Vorgänge



Richtlinie 1/76 zur Bearbeitung Operativer Vorgänge

Signatur: BStU, MfS, AGM, Nr. 198, Bl. 307-367

Blatt 367